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THE STRUCTURAL ROLE OF PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT
MECHANISMS IN PUBLIC LAW
J. MARIA GLOVER*
ABSTRACT
The American regulatory system is unique in that it expressly
relies on a diffuse set of regulators, including private parties, rather
than on a centralized bureaucracy for the effectuation of its
substantive aims. In contrast with more traditional conceptions of
private enforcement as an ad hoc supplement to public law, this
Article argues that private regulation through litigation is integral
to the structure of the modern administrative state. Private litigation
and the mechanisms that enable it are not merely add-ons to our
regulatory regime, much less are they fundamentally at odds with it. 
Yet, mechanisms of enforcement attendant to private suits are
being restricted in numerous ways, and on numerous fronts, in the
form of prohibitions on the use of the class action device, the recali-
bration of procedural mechanisms through private contract to
discourage suit, the heightening of pleading standards, and the pre-
emption of state law causes of action, just to name a few. Although
in some instances these restrictions may provide necessary correctives
to the system of private litigation in particular and to the functioning
of overall regulatory schemes more generally, in their broad-sweeping
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forms, they threaten to systematically undermine substantive
regulatory law. Yet the larger regulatory consequences of these efforts
receive inadequate attention.
This Article thus offers a more systemic view of these private
enforcement mechanisms by providing elements of a conceptual
framework for tailoring mechanisms of private enforcement to the
contours of particular regulatory regimes. This framework seeks to
effectuate and extend the systemic interests in aligning private
enforcement mechanisms with the regulatory goals of particular
areas of substantive law. At the same time, it seeks to balance the
value of such mechanisms with concerns that they will, in some
substantive regimes, generate undesired regulatory consequences.
Indeed, this framework highlights the need, in some instances, for
limitations on the use of private enforcement mechanisms, as well as
the need, in other circumstances, for the creation of new mechanisms
that are more carefully calibrated to address potential pathologies.
This framework is therefore preferable to one-size-fits-all, abstract
approaches to a number of seemingly disparate debates regarding
restrictions on private enforcement mechanisms across our legal
landscape. By offering sounder analysis of, and adding conceptual
clarity to, various debates about these mechanisms, this framework
offers the hope of eventual resolution of these seemingly intractable
disputes. This framework also seeks to provide guidance to judges,
agencies, and legislatures in the task of tailoring mechanisms of
private enforcement to achieve public regulatory objectives. 
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INTRODUCTION
Americans have a love-hate relationship with private enforcement
of their laws. On the one hand, our system often relies heavily and
explicitly on enforcement by private parties to achieve public
regulatory objectives. Whereas European nations regulate the
conduct of their citizens largely using ex ante regulations promul-
gated by a centralized bureaucracy,1 we frequently rely on ex post
law enforcement, much of which results from private suits rather
than from governmental actions.2
At the same time, Americans have a great distrust of private
regulation in general and of private litigation in particular. Various
scholars and practitioners criticize its excesses and inefficiencies.3
Courts, Congress,  private parties, and administrative agencies
seek to limit private enforcement’s role and prevent its abuses.4
1. See infra text accompanying note 382.
2. See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 9 (2001)
(describing the “American way of law” as a system that emphasizes litigant participation and
activism). A number of legal scholars believe that this system of ex post private enforcement
is in many ways for the good. See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, Don’t Forget the Lawyers: The Role
of Lawyers in Promoting the Rule of Law in Emerging Market Democracies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV.
401, 401, 405 (2007); Samuel Issacharoff, Regulating After the Fact, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 375,
377 (2007) (arguing that ex post regulation yields substantial economic benefits because it
dramatically lowers impediments to market entry); William B. Rubenstein, Why Enable
Litigation?: A Positive Externalities Theory of the Small Claims Class Action, 74 UMKC L.
REV. 709, 710 (2006).
3. See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, Fashioning a National Resolution of Asbestos Personal
Injury Litigation: A Reply to Professor Brickman, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1967, 1990 (1992)
(arguing that America needs to reorient its civil justice system to better allocate expenditures
to victim compensation); Amanda M. Rose, The Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud
Deterrence: A Critical Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173, 2176 (2010) (arguing that securities
litigation is often ineffective at deterring securities fraud); John Fabian Witt, Bureaucratic
Legalism, American Style: Private Bureaucratic Legalism and the Governance of the Tort
System, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 261, 261-62 (2007) (noting that the plaintiffs’ bar is typically free
of market controls when pursuing tort claims).
4. See, e.g., Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the
Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227, 247-48 (2007) (noting that administrative
agencies try to limit lawsuits by issuing broad preemptive statements in their preambles).
And just two years ago, the Supreme Court expanded the power of private contracts to restrict
the availability of the class action. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct.
1758, 1776 (2010) (holding that parties must specifically contract for the class action device
in arbitration). Congress also limits the scope of citizen suits in, for instance, environmental
laws. See, e.g., Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 62-
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Especially in the current political environment, measures to curtail
the mechanisms for pursuing existing private rights of action are
widespread, sweep broadly, and emanate from a number of fronts.
These include, for instance, legislative and judicial reform of the
mechanisms for vindicating state tort law claims, limitations on the
use of the class action device, the robust enforcement of contractual
provisions through which defendants eliminate or discourage
private lawsuits, the imposition of a heightened pleading standard
for all cases brought in federal court, and increased federal preemp-
tion of state law claims.5
This Article argues that this intense focus on the pathologies of
private enforcement mechanisms in isolation tends to discount
across the board the structural role these mechanisms play within
regulatory regimes in the American system.6 Regulation of wrong-
doing by private parties is not merely an ad hoc, “private law” sup-
plement to public enforcement by regulators.7 It is often an institu-
tional feature of our public law8—one whose contours need to be
better understood and rationalized, and one whose enabling mech-
anisms ought to be appropriately tailored to the achievement of
public regulatory objectives. The goal of this Article is to analyze as
a conceptual matter the structural role that private parties, as
litigant regulators through various mechanisms of enforcement,
play across a number of substantive areas, and to examine the
64, 67 (1987) (holding that the Clean Water Act provided no jurisdiction for citizens to seek
penalties for past violations); see also infra notes 124-41 and accompanying text (discussing
private parties’ attempts to limit private litigation through contractual provisions prohibiting
the use of class actions).
5. See infra Part II.
6. To be clear, when I refer in this Article to private enforcement mechanisms, I refer
principally to those mechanisms attendant to private rights of action as opposed to other types
of private enforcement mechanisms that exist outside the context of private suits. For a
review of several nonlitigation enforcement mechanisms in environmental law, see David L.
Markell & Tom R. Tyler, Using Empirical Research to Design Government Citizen
Participation Processes: A Case Study of Citizens’ Roles in Environmental Compliance and
Enforcement, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 6, 35-36 (2008). 
7. Evaluating private enforcement as a structural feature of the American regulatory
state has only quite recently begun to develop in political science literature, and little of this
has penetrated the legal academy. This Article systematically aligns its structural approach
to private enforcement mechanisms with that emerging in the social sciences literature, which
contends that intrabranch conflicts encourage Congress to effectuate its aims through private
lawsuits. See, e.g., SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE 4-5 (2010).
8. See infra Part I.A.
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implications of that role both for particular issues before the courts
and for the regulatory state more generally.9 
Legal scholars have observed that private litigation serves as a
complement—often a crucial one—to public enforcement of various
laws,10 and that restrictions of the mechanisms that make such
litigation possible may, as a general matter, lead to undesirable
consequences for the vindication of substantive rights or the deter-
rence of socially undesirable conduct.11 Indeed, our system of regu-
lation is only as good as the enforcement mechanisms underlying
it.12 A systematic effort to rationalize the role of private enforcement
9. Administrative law scholars have begun to explore the implications of congressional
reliance on the judicial system to enforce given regulatory regimes. See, e.g., Margaret H.
Lemos, The Consequences of Congress’s Choice of Delegate: Judicial and Agency
Interpretations of Title VII, 63 VAND. L. REV. 363, 372-73 (2010); Matthew C. Stephenson, The
Legislative Choice Between Agencies and Courts: A Response to Farber and Vermeule, 119
HARV. L. REV. F. 183, 183-84 (2006). The focus on courts and judges necessarily directs
scholars to grapple with questions regarding the extent and consequences of judges’ policy-
making authority. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2087 (1990) (“[Statutory interpretation] calls for an inquiry into
questions of both policy and principle.”). 
10. See, e.g., Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, The Procedural Attack on Civil
Rights: The Empirical Reality of Buckhannon for the Private Attorney General, 54 UCLA L.
REV. 1087, 1088 (2007); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Litigation in the Roberts
Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 345, 409 (2008) (arguing that private enforcement is necessary for some
statutes “because the threat that federal funds will be withheld is remote at best”); Deborah
R. Hensler & Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Beyond “It Just Ain't Worth It”: Alternative Strategies for
Damage Class Action Reform, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137, 137 (2001) (noting private
litigation can “supplement regulatory enforcement by administrative agencies that are under-
funded, susceptible to capture ... or politically constrained”); Richard B. Stewart & Cass R.
Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1213-16 (1982); Robert
B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections upon
Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 860-62 (2003) (highlighting public and private enforcement
mechanisms in securities law).
11. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise
of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 378 (2005) (arguing that class action
waivers prevent deterrence of wrongdoing); Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney
General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 183, 185 (noting the Court’s trend of leaving a formal private
right of action in place, but “constrict[ing] the remedial machinery,” thus “dilut[ing] the value
of the right” and potentially signaling to wrongdoers that “they can infringe the right with
impunity”); Jean R. Sternlight, No: Permitting Companies to Skirt Class Actions Through
Mandatory Arbitration Would Be Dangerous and Unwise, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2002, at
13, 19-20 (arguing that class action waivers prevent deterrence of wrongdoing); J. Maria
Glover, Note, Beyond Unconscionability: Class Action Waivers and Mandatory Arbitration
Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1735, 1764 (2006) (arguing that a normative concern raised by
class action waivers is their ability to prevent the vindication of substantive rights). 
12. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Ian Samuel, The Institutional Dimension of Consumer
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mechanisms and to present a conceptual framework for tailoring
such mechanisms to the needs of particular regulatory regimes is
needed. This Article takes initial steps in this direction by offering
a more systematic account of private regulation’s role in the
American regulatory system and by presenting elements of a con-
ceptual framework for evaluating the extent to which the preserva-
tion or modification of existing private enforcement mechanisms, or
the design of new mechanisms, may or may not be needed within a
specific regulatory scheme. 
By offering a more unified view of the structural role of private
enforcement mechanisms within our regulatory system, this Article
reveals that a number of seemingly disparate doctrinal and schol-
arly debates regarding restrictions on the use of private enforcement
mechanisms are in fact dimensions of a common problem: the de-
gree to which carefully tailored mechanisms will better effectuate
overall regulatory objectives and ensure meaningful regulation of
conduct deemed wrongful by appropriate lawmaking bodies.13 The
tendency has been to evaluate these debates in isolation from one
another and without attention to the structural role that these
mechanisms play in a particular regulatory framework. The essen-
tial goal of tailoring private enforcement mechanisms to the specific
exigencies of particular areas of law in order to enable private regu-
lation to better serve the structural role it has been given in the
American regulatory state is often lost from sight.14 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I traces the historical
origins of the United States’ diffuse system of regulation and the
role private-party litigants play as regulators in that system. It also
explores the American regulatory system’s functional dependence
on private regulation and the mechanisms that enable it. As Part II
explains, however, the country is flooded with efforts to curtail these
Protection, in NEW FRONTIERS OF CONSUMER PROTECTION 47, 49 (Fabrizio Cafaggi & Hans-W.
Micklitz eds., 2009) (noting that regulation cannot spring into being without the support of
institutional commitments). 
13. See infra Part III.
14. To be sure, a system of diffuse regulation heavily dependent on private enforcement
for the achievement of its substantive goals is not the only system that the United States
could have adopted. It is not the aim of this Article to advocate for the superiority or
inferiority of such a system. Rather, the goal here is to better integrate and design
mechanisms of private enforcement within the diffuse regulatory structure that exists today.
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mechanisms of enforcement. Although such efforts, in many cir-
cumstances, may provide necessary correctives to the litigation
system, they may pose serious problems in other contexts when they
threaten to undermine the achievement of regulatory objectives. 
Two vital implications of private ex post enforcement mecha-
nisms’ role in our regulatory structure are, first, the need to identify
the circumstances in which such mechanisms are more or less
important to the functioning of a given regulatory scheme and,
second, the need to design and calibrate appropriate mechanisms to
facilitate that enforcement. Part III provides elements of a concep-
tual framework both for evaluating the importance of and for
designing appropriate private enforcement mechanisms within a
given regulatory scheme. 
In particular, this Part provides four operational criteria that
seek to better guide courts, legislatures, and administrative agen-
cies in tailoring mechanisms of private enforcement to the particu-
lar exigencies of the regulatory scheme and the potential private-
party regulator. First, all things being equal, enforcement mecha-
nisms should be entrusted to, and tailored to the needs of, the
regulator with superior information relevant to potential wrongdo-
ing under a given regulatory scheme.15 Second, private enforcement
mechanisms should be integrated with other regulatory efforts when
necessary to effectuate the complete range of remedies provided in
a given scheme, but tailored appropriately so as not to generate
over-remediation.16 Third, evaluation and design of private enforce-
ment mechanisms, and particularly analysis of such mechanisms
under preemption doctrines, should explicitly account for the poten-
tial importance of these ex post mechanisms to a regime’s compre-
hensive regulation of harm that is difficult to prevent ex ante, while
also paying careful heed to the extent to which private enforcement
may disrupt national uniformity of regulation.17 Fourth and finally,
even for regulatory regimes in which a public regulatory body pos-
sesses informational advantages relative to private parties, and
even for those in which the relevant public regulatory scheme
technically provides for complete and comprehensive regulation of
15. See infra Part III.A.
16. See infra Part III.B.
17. See infra Part III.C.
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wrongdoing absent private regulation, to the extent regulatory ex-
perience indicates a pattern of underenforcement by the public
regulatory body, appropriate enforcement mechanisms should be
allocated to private parties to ensure the proper achievement of
regulatory goals.18
Although these criteria are not exhaustive, collectively they
present a more unified approach to the design of private enforce-
ment mechanisms better tailored to the exigencies of particular
regulatory regimes. This framework is offered in place of existing,
ad hoc approaches to various debates regarding the curtailment of
private enforcement.19 This approach, I argue, is commended by a
rigorous analysis of the need for better integration of private en-
forcement mechanisms into the American regulatory state.
I. THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF DIFFUSE REGULATION: PRIVATE
LITIGANTS AS REGULATORS
Legal scholars and political scientists alike have long recognized
that the American approach to regulation is unique. With some
notable exceptions—for instance, Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) approval for pharmaceuticals and other biologics and li-
censing or permitting requirements under various environmental
regulations20—the predominant approach to regulation in the
United States is ex post rather than ex ante.21 In other words, we
often regulate by imposing consequences on those who violate sub-
stantive law after the resulting harms have occurred. Our regula-
tory system tends not to require individuals or entities to comply
with detailed regulatory schemes before acting.22 As one scholar
18. See infra Part III.D.
19. See supra notes 9-12.
20. See, e.g., Decision in Wash. Legal Found’n v. Henney, 65 Fed. Reg. 14,286, 14,286
(Mar. 16, 2000); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Modes of Regulatory Enforcement and the Problem of
Administrative Discretion, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1275, 1330 (1999).
21. Issacharoff, supra note 2, at 377-78.
22. As a descriptive matter, it is uncontroversial that the United States regulatory regime
relies largely on ex post regulation. See, e.g., KAGAN, supra note 2, at 16 (“[I]n the United
States lawyers, legal rights, judges, and lawsuits are the functional equivalent of the large
central bureaucracies that dominate governance in high-tax, activist welfare states.”);
Issacharoff, supra note 2, at 377. As a normative matter, scholars have long debated the
tradeoffs between ex ante versus ex post regulation in general and the reliance on private civil
1146 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1137
put it, the United States generally regulates “consequences,” not
“[market] entry.”23 
The American approach to regulation is also extraordinary in that
it entrusts ex post law enforcement not to a centralized state
bureaucracy but rather to a diffuse set of regulators. The United
States harnesses private citizens, public regulatory bodies, nongov-
ernmental organizations, and private market agents to regulate
social harm.24 Within that diffuse enforcement system, the primacy
of private enforcement through litigation is partly a consequence of
America’s earliest regulatory design, which relied largely on com-
mon law for the imposition of liability.25 More recently, private
enforcement has been a consequence of deliberate statutory design
and, further, of functional limitations of public regulatory bodies’
ability to achieve regulatory objectives.26 This Part traces the
historical roots of the private parties’ structural role in the Ameri-
can system of ex post regulation and then discusses the functional
need for enforcement by private parties to ensure reliable regulation
of wrongdoing.27 
A. A Brief History of the Role of Private Enforcement in the  
American Regulatory State
The unique regulatory regime in the United States, with its
pronounced reliance on private enforcement through litigation, was
litigation in particular. See, e.g., Charles Silver, Does Civil Justice Cost Too Much?, 80 TEX.
L. REV. 2073, 2075-78 (2002) (cataloguing critiques of the civil justice system’s costs); Jules
Stuyck, Public and Private Enforcement in Consumer Protection: General Comparison EU-
USA, in NEW FRONTIERS OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 12, at 63, 77 (noting that
private enforcement may be less preferable to public enforcement because of problems of
“accountability, legitimacy and transparency, frivolous action and over deterrence”). This
Article does not seek to revisit these debates; rather, it seeks to provide a framework for
evaluating mechanisms of enforcement within our existing regulatory system.
23. Issacharoff, supra note 2, at 377.
24. See KAGAN, supra note 2, at 29.
25. See infra text accompanying note 30.
26. See supra text accompanying notes 31-33.
27. It is difficult, if not impossible, to isolate with precision optimal levels of enforcement.
Entire schools of scholarship have attempted to do so, with no one account fully satisfying all.
One can safely suppose, however, that zero or near-zero levels of enforcement are not optimal
and that reliable enforcement is a good minimum target. That said, in achieving that target,
we should seek to avoid undesirable regulatory consequences. See infra Part III.B.
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by no means inevitable. As a theoretical matter, ex post regulation
could be conducted by governmental bodies; indeed, that is the
framework in which criminal law operates. That said, the primacy
of ex post private enforcement in the American regulatory sys-
tem is not terribly surprising; it is in large part an outgrowth of
America’s inherited regulatory design, which relied largely on
private suits brought pursuant to common law doctrines, as opposed
to ex ante public regulation of wrongdoing by governmental bodies.28 
At the turn of the twentieth century, and partly in response to
industrial modernization and the nationalization of various types
of harms, Congress began to enact a number of laws that relied
increasingly on public governmental bodies for their enforcement.
During the height of America’s gravitation toward centralized regu-
lation in the New Deal Era, Congress generally chose “bureaucracy-
centered enforcement regimes” that entrusted to administrative
agencies the primary responsibility for investigating wrongdoing,
holding hearings, and issuing orders.29 But even then, Congress’s
reliance on centralized bureaucracies was circumscribed in that it
left a great deal of ex post regulation to the already functioning
common law system, the reach of which only increased in the latter
half of the twentieth century with the emergence of a number of
28. To be sure, compared with the nature of the modern administrative state, the
regulatory landscape throughout much of America’s history was characterized by relatively
little ex ante or ex post regulation. Some scholars argue that such a state of affairs is
normatively preferable. See PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: HOW LAW IS
SUFFOCATING AMERICA 11 (1994) (arguing that the United States’ regulatory system “goes too
far”); see also DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, ONLY ONE PLACE OF REDRESS: AFRICAN AMERICANS, LABOR
REGULATIONS, AND THE COURTS FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE NEW DEAL 114-15 (2001)
(arguing that antiregulatory decisions like Lochner protected minorities from discriminatory
regulations); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, OVERDOSE: HOW EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT REGULATION
STIFLES PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 10-12 (2006). 
29. Sean Farhang, The Political Development of Job Discrimination Litigation, 1963-1976,
23 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 23, 24 (2009).
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relatively expansive tort doctrines.30 In any event, heavy relative
reliance on bureaucratic enforcement was short lived. 
During the second half of the twentieth century, the role of
private litigation in the American regulatory system was enhanced
considerably when it was given a meaningful foothold across a broad
spectrum of statutory law. This development was the product of
conscious congressional choice: particularly in the last five decades,
Congress has put into place a number of private ex post enforcement
mechanisms—often in the form of statutes creating private rights
of action31—to help effectuate its substantive aims. At the same
time, Congress has often explicitly rejected bureaucratic enforce-
ment regimes for the implementation of those directives.32 As one
scholar put it, instead of building a European-style regulatory state,
the United States “constructed the litigation state.”33 
The design of employment discrimination regulation provides a
clear instantiation of this broader trend. Congress originally en-
trusted enforcement of federal employment and labor laws princi-
30. See George L. Priest, Lawyers, Liability, and Law Reform: Effects on American
Economic Growth and Trade Competitiveness, 71 DENV. U. L. REV. 115, 134-39 (1993)
(discussing the expanded tort doctrines that emerged in the second half of the twentieth
century); Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modern
American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601, 619 (1992) (investigating reasons for the large rise
in tort liability in the 1960s and 1970s); Gary T. Schwartz, The Vitality of Negligence and the
Ethics of Strict Liability, 15 GA. L. REV. 963, 963-64 (1981) (documenting the rise of strict
liability and the lessening of requirements for negligence). 
31. Of course, Congress has enacted a number of statutes that are silent on whether their
provisions create a private right of action. In these instances, established doctrine specifies
the conditions under which courts should find an implied private right of action. See Cort v.
Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (setting forth a four-part inquiry for determining whether a
statute contains an implied right of action). Whether that doctrine produces too much, or too
little, private enforcement of a given regulatory scheme can also be analyzed under the
conceptual framework presented in this Article. Moreover, there is ongoing debate about how
to interpret the laws that Congress has passed against a background assumption that implied
rights of action are the norm and not the exception. Compare, e.g., Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep.
Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 294 n.1 (1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court should,
when engaging in statutory interpretation, take into account background assumptions in
favor of the availability of private enforcement against which Congress has legislated), and
Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 698-99 (1979) (same), with Thompson v. Thompson, 484
U.S. 174, 192 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court should not infer private
rights of action). Although the framework set forth here may provide guidance for this debate,
the attendant issues raised by such questions require a more robust analysis than one article
can provide. I therefore defer such questions to a subsequent article.
32. See, e.g., FARHANG, supra note 7, at 3.
33. Id. at 214.
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pally to administrative agencies.34 But when Congress enacted Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), it transferred primary
responsibility for regulating such discrimination to private party
litigants and refused the requests of civil rights advocates to vest
such authority in the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) through cease-and-desist powers.35 In an effort to promote
private enforcement of Title VII, Congress included a provision for
awarding attorneys’ fees to prevailing plaintiffs.36 Congress solid-
ified its reliance on private enforcement in the 1970s; when asked
again by civil rights advocates to give cease-and-desist pow-
ers—which such advocates had since determined were indispensable
to the enforcement of Title VII—to the EEOC as a complement to
private lawsuits, Congress once more refused.37 Congress accorded
the EEOC very little power to promulgate regulations under Title
VII.38 Congress also restricted the EEOC’s authority to bring suit
under Title VII,39 instead relegating its role to one of administrative
gatekeeping for private lawsuits.40 Empirical evidence reveals the
significant practical consequences of these choices: in the last
decade, a mere 2 percent of job discrimination suits were prosecuted
34. See id. at 85.
35. PAUL FRYMER, BLACK AND BLUE: AFRICAN AMERICANS, THE LABOR MOVEMENT, AND THE
DECLINE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY 39-40 (2008).
36. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(k), 78 Stat. 241, 261 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2006)).
37. FARHANG, supra note 7, at 132-33.
38. When Title VII was originally enacted, Congress gave the EEOC authority only to
promulgate “procedural regulations.” Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 713(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-12(a)). When it amended Title VII in 1972, Congress gave the EEOC more
enforcement responsibility but left the agency’s authority to promulgate regulations
unchanged. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, sec. 5, § 707,
86 Stat. 103, 107 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8). As a consequence, the EEOC frequently
finds its positions rejected by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499
U.S. 244, 248-49 (1991) (rejecting the EEOC’s position that Title VII applies extraterritorially
to regulate employment practices of American employers employing American citizens
abroad); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 140-43 (1976) (rejecting EEOC guidelines on
coverage of pregnancy-based discrimination under Title VII).
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (creating a private right of action); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6
(granting EEOC limited authority to bring suits). 
40. See, e.g., Brown v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 824 (1976) (noting a lower court’s
holding that private parties are required to exhaust administrative remedies before filing a
private action, but declining to decide the issue); Johnson v. Ry. Exp. Agency, Inc., 421 U.S.
454, 460-61 (1975) (concluding that Congress did not anticipate that remedies available under
42 U.S.C. § 1981 would be sought until Title VII procedures had been completed). 
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by the federal government, and 98 percent of suits were brought by
private parties.41 
Similarly, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)—which estab-
lished minimum wage, overtime pay, and other labor standards
—also established a regulatory scheme that was largely dependent
on enforcement by private litigation.42 Over time, Congress in-
creased incentives for private suit under the FLSA,43 while simulta-
neously limiting funding for the Department of Labor (DOL),44
which, as a consequence, decreased significantly its own FLSA en-
forcement efforts.45 Further, Congress did not seek to secure com-
pliance with wage standards through continuing public regulatory
supervision of employer practices but rather relied on information
and complaints provided by employees bringing claims in court.46
Again, empirical evidence reveals the significance of these choices:
the DOL investigates fewer than 1 percent of FLSA-covered em-
ployers each year.47 Moreover, the DOL has largely fallen off the
radar with regard to FLSA interpretation. Rather, in recent years,
it is the courts, by way of private litigation, that have driven
interpretation of the FLSA.48
41. FARHANG, supra note 7, at 3.
42. That said, even the original enactment of FLSA placed a lot of enforcement
responsibility in private hands: it provided a private right of action, it provided a class
mechanism, and it provided for awarding attorneys’ fees to prevailing parties. Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, ch. 676, § 16, 52 Stat. 1060, 1069 (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 216).
43. Fair Labor Standards Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-151, sec. 10, § 16(b)-(c),
91 Stat. 1245, 1252 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 216). 
44. From 1975 to 2004, the number of DOL investigators decreased by 14 percent to a
total of only 788 individuals nationwide. Annette Bernhardt & Siobhán McGrath, Trends in
Wage and Hour Enforcement by the U.S. Department of Labor, 1975-2004, ECON. POL’Y BRIEF
(Brennan Ctr. for Justice, New York, N.Y.), Sept. 2005, available at http://www.
brennancenter.org/page/-/d/download_file_8423.pdf.
45. See, e.g., id. at 1-2 (noting that DOL enforcement actions under FLSA decreased by
36 percent between 1975 and 2004); Catherine K. Ruckelshaus, Labor’s Wage War, 35
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 373, 375 (2008) (noting that DOL enforcement of FLSA is quite low). 
46. Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960).
47. As of 2007, there were 7.3 million employers regulated under the FLSA by the Wage
and Hour Division (WHD). The WHD has roughly 1000 full-time investigators and inspects
approximately 40,000 employers each year. “The probability of any single employer or
workplace being inspected is therefore very small”—roughly 0.5 percent. DAVID WEIL,
IMPROVING WORKPLACE CONDITIONS THROUGH STRATEGIC ENFORCEMENT 49 (2010), available
at http://www.dol.gov/whd/resources/strategicEnforcement.pdf. 
48. See, e.g., IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 37, 39-40 (2005) (holding that the time
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The labor and employment law story is typical. In various
domains of public law, as in Title VII and the FLSA, Congress has
vested in private parties a great deal of responsibility for enforce-
ment by extending the statutory mechanisms provided to private
parties in order to facilitate and incentivize private suits; Congress
has correspondingly decreased the enforcement mechanisms
available to relevant public regulatory bodies, which have suffered
budget cuts and have decreased their enforcement efforts, even as
the number of employers covered by these laws has grown signifi-
cantly.49 This trend can be seen in a wide range of substantive
areas, ranging from consumer lending to civil rights abuses to
antitrust. In these areas, Congress has created private rights of
action and incorporated other enforcement incentives, such as
damage multipliers, statutory damages, punitive damages, and fee-
shifting.50 
A wealth of explanations has been offered for the rise of congres-
sional reliance on private litigation, as opposed to centralized
bureaucracy, for the regulation of wrongdoing. Some political scien-
tists argue that Congress entrusted private parties with primary
enforcement responsibility because it doubted the government’s
capacity to meet enforcement needs.51 Others argue, more cynically,
spent walking between production and changing areas where employees “don” and “doff”
protective gear, as well as time spent waiting to “doff,” is compensable time under the FLSA).
The Court recently decided that an employee may state a claim under the FLSA based solely
on oral complaints to supervisors and human resources personnel. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain
Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1336 (2011) (holding that the anti-retaliation
provision of FLSA protects oral as well as written complaints). 
49. For instance, from 1975 to 2004, the number of DOL wage-and-hour dispute
investigators decreased by 14 percent and enforcement actions decreased by 36 percent;
meanwhile the number of businesses covered by the wage-and-hour laws increased from 3.9
million to 8.4 million. Bernhardt & McGrath, supra note 44, at 2. 
50. See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006) (creating a private
right of action and allowing plaintiffs to recover attorneys’ fees and expert fees); Toxic
Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (same); Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff &
Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 151 (1987) (“Both RICO and the Clayton Act are designed to
remedy economic injury by providing for the recovery of treble damages, costs, and attorney’s
fees.”); Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 401-03 (1968) (noting that
attorneys’ fee provisions are needed in Title VII cases to incentivize individuals with racial
discrimination claims to sue); Davis v. Werne, 673 F.2d 866, 869 (5th Cir. 1982) (noting that
statutory damages are available under the Truth-in-Lending Act (TILA) to encourage “private
attorneys general” to assist in the enforcement of that statute). 
51. For instance, one commentator notes that Congress believed that “the federal
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that legislators rely on private parties when they want credit for
crafting broad policies but not the burdens of administering and
enforcing them.52 Relying on empirical evidence, Sean Farhang
contends instead that ideological conflict between Congress and the
President accounts for the increased reliance on private attorneys,
as opposed to executive agencies, for the implementation of various
statutory regimes.53 
Farhang’s hypothesis is consistent with the view of leading
administrative law scholars, who have posited, under the “slack
minimization” theory, that “legislators prefer delegation to an
agency rather than a court when the ideological distance between
legislator and agency is smaller than that between legislator and
court.”54 Another explanation, referred to as the “blame deflection”
theory, posits that congressional delegations to courts may be pre-
ferred to delegations to administrative agencies, given that the
latter are subject to ongoing congressional control and, therefore,
might take actions for which the electorate will hold Congress at
least partially responsible.55 Other scholars have hypothesized
that Congress might delegate to courts when it wishes to achieve
stability of interpretation, or stickiness—that is, non-fluctuating
decisions over time.56
government would be unable to handle all the cases involving [public accommodations and
employment] discrimination.” Mary Frances Derfner, One Giant Step: The Civil Rights
Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 21 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 441, 442 (1977).
52. FRYMER, supra note 35, at 76-77.
53. FARHANG, supra note 7, at 60-61. The scholarly community has long accepted the
notion that the President exercises a great deal of control over administrative agencies,
although recent work by administrative law scholars has challenged this assertion
empirically. See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative
State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 49-50, 69
(2006) (concluding that the President does affect agency decision making, but to a lesser
degree than many proponents of the presidential control model have espoused). 
54. Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty, Risk,
and the Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1035, 1043 (2006).
55. Id. at 1044. 
56. See, e.g., Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 317, 327-28 (2005) (“A majority of the circuits has explicitly adopted the super-
strong presumption against overruling statutory precedents, and in those circuits that have
never explicitly applied the rule, separate opinions assume that it applies.” (citation omitted));
Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the Administrative State: A Structural and
Institutional Defense of Judicial Power over Statutory Interpretation, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1239,
1247 (2002) (“[J]udges ... are subject to strong institutional norms that render judicial
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Although resolving these competing explanations is beyond the
scope of this Article, the consensus binding all of these scholars is
that the American system of separation of powers has produced a
heavy dependence on ex post mechanisms of regulation that are
spread among a diffuse set of institutional actors, including private
litigants. Consequently, the availability of meaningful ex post
private enforcement is a significant determinant of the rule of law’s
operation within the United States. And given the various limita-
tions of public agencies in conducting meaningful ex post regulation,
whether sufficient and appropriately designed mechanisms exist to
marshal private parties to engage in ex post enforcement has a
dramatic effect on the extent to which behavior deemed harmful by
democratically accountable bodies is in fact regulated.
B. The Functional Role of Private Enforcement in the American
Regulatory State
This Subpart focuses, with specific examples, on the pathologies
that result from overreliance on inadequate public regulatory
bodies, and argues that reliance on private enforcement is not only
descriptively accurate but also functionally necessary in some cir-
cumstances. First, such enforcement is critical when private parties,
as a functional matter, bear primary responsibility for enforcement
if there is to be meaningful regulation of wrongdoing in a particular
area at all. Second, private parties may need to assume a regulatory
role—though to an admittedly lesser degree—in areas of the law in
which private parties provide complementary enforcement to con-
strained public regulatory bodies. 
1. Private Litigants as Primary Regulators
Private parties function as crucial regulators within various areas
of law because of limitations on public bodies that circumscribe their
effectiveness in achieving regulatory goals. To begin, public gov-
ernmental enforcement bodies have limited resources that are often
insufficient to perform the functions with which they are tasked.
interpretation more stable and consistent over time than interpretation by successive political
administrations.”). 
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Indeed, for most public regulatory bodies, scarce resources are the
rule, not the exception.57 Moreover, public civil enforcers in some
regulatory areas suffer informational disadvantages.58 Those disad-
vantages arise for a simple reason: the best sources of information
about private wrongs are often the parties themselves, because they
tend to have superior knowledge regarding the costs and benefits of
given activities, the costs of reducing risks of harm, and the
probability or severity of risk.59 By contrast, public regulatory bodies
are generally distant geographically from sites of harm, which
not only limits their ability to access or be accessed by those who
suffered alleged harm but also reduces their ability to even know
57. For example, because of limited resources, the FDA relies largely on voluntary
compliance with the Federal Drug and Cosmetic Act once a drug has been approved. See
Decision in Wash. Legal Found’n v. Henney, 65 Fed. Reg. 14,286, 14,286 (Mar. 16, 2000)
(explaining that to introduce an approved drug into interstate commerce for a “new use,” an
individual must submit an application to the FDA for approval). There are also a number of
drugs, like homeopathics, that the FDA simply lacks the resources to regulate at all. See Amy
Gaither, Comment, Over the Counter, Under the Radar: How the Zicam Incident Came About
Under FDA’s Historic Homeopathic Exception, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 487, 490, 500-01 (2010). As
another example, the National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration (NHTSA) has few
resources to devote to its regulatory functions, which include “inspecting vehicle defects and
creating new federal safety standards.” Joel Finch, Student Article, Toyota Sudden
Acceleration: A Case Study of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration: Recalls for
Change, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 472, 492 (2010). Indeed, the NHTSA closed the
investigation of Toyota accelerator problems, despite having received sixty-four complaints
alleging sudden acceleration in the same model of Toyota, because of limited resources. Id.;
see also Denial of Motor Vehicle Defect Petition, 74 Fed. Reg. 56,686, 56,686, 56,690-91 tbl.2
(Nov. 2, 2009). As yet another example, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) often
abbreviates its Environmental Impact Study process in ways that are “scientifically
incomplete,” because it “lack[s] the resources to fully apply [its] expertise.” Aliza M. Cohen,
Note, NEPA in the Hot Seat: A Proposal for an Office of Environmental Analysis, 44 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 169, 203 (2010). Similarly, because of its budget constraints, the BLM must also
limit the range of alternatives it will consider for all land use planning projects to four
options. See The Role of NEPA in the Intermountain States: Oversight Field Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on Res., 109th Cong. 29 (2005) (statement of Dave Brown, Regional Regulatory
Advisor (Rocky Mountain Region), BP America, Inc.). Indeed, the regulatory landscape for
environmental law is generally characterized by limited government resources. See David L.
Markell, The Role of Deterrence-Based Enforcement in a “Reinvented” State/Federal
Relationship: The Divide Between Theory and Reality, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 22 (2000)
(quoting Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of
Violations, 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706, 66,706-07 (Dec. 22, 1995)). 
58. See Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD.
357, 359, 365 (1984) (noting that information differentials cut in favor of private versus public
regulation of injury risk). 
59. See id. at 359.
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that such harm occurred in the first place.60 Finally, as public choice
scholars have long lamented, public regulatory bodies are poten-
tially subject to capture by well-capitalized or politically influential
interest groups.61 
Private enforcement provides, in many respects, a direct response
to the functional limitations of public regulatory bodies in the
enforcement of various laws. It provides protections against harm
based on the initiative of a few, which counters the problem of
limited agency resources. It also provides a “back-up” system of
redress, which responds both to the problem of limited agency
resources and to the limited ability of ex ante regulations to
anticipate and prevent malfeasance.62 Moreover, reliance on private
suits addresses the informational disadvantages to which public
regulatory bodies can be subject, given that—as noted above—it is
often those who have suffered some sort of harm who possess the
best information about any alleged statutory or common law
violation.63 Although private parties will not always possess such
informational advantages—as is the case, for instance, in situations
where regulation requires technical and specialized expertise64 or
access to and ability to comprehend comparative data65—those who
commit wrongdoing, and victims of such wrongdoing, often have
superior access to relevant information.66 Private litigation also
gives individuals a “personal role and stake in the administration
60. See Samuel Issacharoff, Group Litigation of Consumer Claims: Lessons from the U.S.
Experience, 34 TEX. INT’L L.J. 135, 139 (1999) (noting that distance from victims of consumer
fraud reduces the likelihood that public enforcement officials will be aware of such harms). 
61. See, e.g., MAXWELL L. STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 16-17, 21 (1997);
Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101
YALE L.J. 31, 32, 35-36 (1991). 
62. See Richard B. Stewart, Crisis in Tort Law? The Institutional Perspective, 54 U. CHI.
L. REV. 184, 198 (1987) (discussing private enforcement as a method to address problems
inadequately dealt with by public institutions). 
63. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
64. See Steven Shavell, supra note 58, at 369 (noting that there are some instances in
which a regulatory agency “may enjoy a positive [informational] advantage relative to private
parties”). 
65. For instance, in the environmental arena, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
and other public regulatory bodies have access to information about compliance through
various mandatory reporting requirements and government inspections that is less available
to private parties. See, e.g., Markell, supra note 57, at 59-60 (discussing the relationship
between the EPA and the states with respect to enforcement and compliance programs).
66. See Shavell, supra note 58, at 366-67.
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of justice” and provides an avenue of redress that is more insulated
from political capture than public agencies.67
The area of consumer product safety provides one of the clearest
examples of the need for private enforcement in light of the func-
tional limitations of the relevant public regulatory bodies. The
Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) was described at its
inception as “the most powerful Federal regulatory agency ever
created,”68 and was given broad powers to investigate;69 promulgate
safety standards;70 ban products;71 seek judicial seizure and con-
demnation of “imminently hazardous” products;72 and seek orders
requiring public notification of hazards, recalls, and the like.73
Despite these broad powers, “the CPSC has been chronically under-
funded and understaffed.”74 Between 1975 and 1990, its budget
decreased by 60 percent and its staffing by 41 percent.75 These
resource limitations had an unsurprising effect on the CPSC’s
ability to enforce consumer-protection laws: its investigations were
limited, and it was required to close various offices.76 The CPSC was
thus relegated to a “little known” and “obscure” federal agency.77
Moreover, the CPSC in particular, and consumer-protection
agencies more generally, proved especially vulnerable to capture by
67. Stewart, supra note 62, at 198. To be sure, private enforcement has its share of
disadvantages. For example, the system of litigation is complex and expensive and, as such,
may be out of reach for a number of people, particularly the poor. See, e.g., Eloise Pasachoff,
Special Education, Poverty, and the Limits of Private Enforcement, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1413, 1426-35 (2011) (detailing the ways in which poor students are insufficiently aided by
private enforcement mechanisms under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA)). 
68. David Swit, An Overview of Public Law 92-573, Speech Before Proceedings of the
Briefing Conference on the Consumer Product Safety Act 7 (June 11-12, 1973). 
69. 15 U.S.C. § 2054(b) (2006).
70. 15 U.S.C. § 2056(a) (stating that standards must be “reasonably necessary to prevent
or reduce an unreasonable risk of injury”).
71. 15 U.S.C. § 2057. 
72. 15 U.S.C. § 2061(a), (b)(2).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 2064.
74. Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional
Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 67 (2010).
75. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HRD-92-37R, INFORMATION ON CPSC 7-9 (1992);
see also Barkow, supra note 74, at 67.
76. Robert S. Adler, From “Model Agency” to Basket Case—Can the Consumer Product
Safety Commission Be Redeemed?, 41 ADMIN. L. REV. 61, 75 (1989). 
77. See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 2, at 382.
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the well-capitalized entities they were set up to regulate.78 Though
created to solicit the input of consumer groups regarding issues of
consumer safety, the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA)79 carried
with it a notice and rulemaking process so burdensome that it was
“affordable only to industry groups with an economic stake in the
outcome.”80 And although Congress just recently provided for a more
cooperative relationship between the CPSC and state attorneys
general in the enforcement of consumer protection laws, the 2008
changes leave in place the CPSA provision that preempts state
product safety requirements, and state attorneys general are still
prohibited from seeking civil penalties.81 If there is to be reliable
regulation of consumer product safety, then it must emanate from
private parties under traditional common law doctrines or con-
sumer protection statutes.
The public regulatory landscape is also quite weak in the area of
Title VII employment discrimination.82 Under Title VII, the EEOC
is charged with investigating employee complaints, but its historical
level of activity on this score, across multiple presidential adminis-
trations, is so limited as to be essentially inconsequential in terms
of achieving the regulatory objectives of Title VII.83 Indeed, even
when the EEOC finds cause to believe that employment discrimina-
tion has occurred in any given complaint, it takes action in such
instances less than 5 percent of the time.84 For instance, in fiscal
year 2000, the EEOC found reasonable cause to believe that employ-
78. See, e.g., Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, A Bias Toward Business?:
Assessing Interest Group Influence on U.S. Bureaucracy, 68 J. POL. 128, 129 (2006)
(“[B]usiness interests enjoy disproportionate influence over rulemaking outputs despite the
supposedly equalizing effects of notice and comment procedures.”).
79. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2089 (2006).
80. Teresa M. Schwartz, The Consumer Product Safety Commission: A Flawed Product
of the Consumer Decade, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 32, 63-64 (1982). The process was so
burdensome that Congress revoked it. Consumer Product Safety Amendments of 1981, Pub.
L. No. 97-35, § 1210, 95 Stat. 703, 721 (amending scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and repealing
§ 2059).
81. Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (CPSIA), Pub. L. No. 110-314, 122
Stat. 3016 (to be codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
82. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
83. See Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing
and Employment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1401, 1430-31 (1988); see also Karlan, supra note 11, at
204-05. 
84. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 290 n.7 (2002). 
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ment discrimination had occurred in 8248 employee complaints, yet
the EEOC filed only 291 lawsuits that year.85 Overall, in fact, “the
EEOC files fewer than two percent of all antidiscrimination claims
in federal court.”86 Moreover, the EEOC’s success rates in obtaining
relief for claimants are significantly below that of other administra-
tive agencies.87 
2. Private Litigants as Supplementary Regulators
Even when public enforcement is relatively robust, private en-
forcement may serve a complementary regulatory role in the
achievement of various substantive goals.88 Scholars have in recent
years rightfully challenged the extent to which this state of affairs
is desirable, particularly when private litigation may result in
duplicative punishment of particular actors, or when private parties
may suffer informational disadvantages relative to public regulatory
bodies.89 To be sure, in areas of the law in which robust public
enforcement exists, limitations on private litigation should, as a
functional matter, be met with less skepticism, and indeed might
provide needed correctives to problems of regulatory overkill.90 For
instance, the area of antitrust law is characterized by fairly rigorous
public ex post regulation. Congress gave the Department of Justice
(DOJ) “primary enforcement authority” for Sherman Act viola-
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. For instance, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) settles
approximately 90 percent of filed charges, Clyde Summers, Effective Remedies for Employment
Rights: Preliminary Guidelines and Proposals, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 457, 472-73, 495 nn.240 &
243, 503 (1992), and the Labor Department settles a high percentage of charges filed under
the FLSA, though recovery is low: 87 percent of the charges filed with the NLRB are resolved
before a complaint is issued. Id. The EEOC, in contrast, finds in favor of defendants in
“approximately 95% of the complaints” resolved. Selmi, supra note 83, at 1429.
88. In some instances, the complementary enforcement by private parties is directly
intertwined with public enforcement of a statutory regime. For instance, private parties play
an explicitly complementary role in the enforcement of the False Claims Act through the
bringing of qui tam lawsuits. See, e.g., Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v.
United States ex rel. Wilson, 130 S. Ct. 1396 (2010). This Section discusses less formalized
arrangements for complementary enforcement by private parties.
89. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 3, at 2175-76 (arguing that securities class actions bring
about overregulation of the securities markets).
90. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for
Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 114, 116-17 (2005). 
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tions.91 As a functional matter, DOJ enforcement of the antitrust
laws is relatively robust,92 in part because of its Corporate Leniency
Program (Amnesty Program), whereby the DOJ reduces the crim-
inal penalty that would otherwise be incurred by the first entity to
disclose details of an antitrust conspiracy to which it was a party.93
Accordingly, in the context of antitrust and similar regimes, private
enforcement mechanisms need to be carefully tailored to regulatory
needs and potentially circumscribed to the extent they combine with
public regulation in a way that clearly threatens to achieve over-
deterrence. 
In other areas of the law, however, private parties arguably
remain a necessary complement to public enforcement of statutory
directives. Take, for instance, the area of securities law. Although
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has primary
enforcement authority of federal securities laws, even SEC commis-
sioners acknowledge that private enforcement plays a crucial role
in regulating securities fraud: “Private enforcement is a necessary
supplement to the work that the S.E.C. does. It is also a safety valve
against the potential capture of the agency by industry.”94 As just
one example, two pension funds that filed suit under the securities
laws were responsible for exposing WorldCom’s fraud, eventually
leading to the compensation of investors.95 Given that “[t]he re
91. Phillip G. Oldham, Regulatory Consent Decrees: An Argument for Deference to Agency
Interpretations, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 393, 409 (1995).
92. In fiscal year 2007, for instance, the DOJ “obtained over $630 million in criminal
fines.” Scott D. Hammond, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Recent Developments, Trends, and Milestones in the Antitrust Division’s Criminal
Enforcement Program, Speech Before the ABA Section of Antitrust Law Spring Meeting 1
(Mar. 26, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/232716.pdf. 
93. At the least, the DOJ considers the program successful as compared to its other
enforcement efforts. See Scott D. Hammond, Dir. of Criminal Enforcement, Antitrust Div.,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, When Calculating the Costs and Benefits of Applying for Corporate
Amnesty, How Do You Put a Price Tag on an Individual’s Freedom?, Speech Before the ABA
Criminal Justice Section National Institute on White Collar Crime 2 (Mar. 8, 2001), available
at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/7647.htm (noting that between 1995 and 2000,
“the Amnesty Program [was] responsible for detecting and prosecuting more antitrust
violations than all of [the Antitrust Division’s] search warrants, consensual-monitored audio
or video tapes, and cooperating informants combined”).
94. Stephen Labaton, Businesses Seek New Protection on Legal Front, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29,
2006, at A1 (quoting a former SEC commissioner).
95. See In re MCI WorldCom, Inc., Sec. Litig., 191 F. Supp. 2d 778 (2002); see also In re
WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 02 CIV 3288, 2004 WL 2591402, at *1, *23 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12,
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sources of the [SEC] are adequate to prosecute only the most
flagrant abuses,”96 private litigation mechanisms—perhaps even
some not yet in existence, given the inability of many existing
mechanisms to detect fraud—may often be needed to prevent a
noninsignificant amount of misconduct from escaping regulation. 
In short, private parties, at least as a functional matter, are often
necessary for meaningful enforcement of regulatory directives to
occur.97 As the next Part shows, however, the mechanisms by which
such regulation is achieved are being removed from the legal
landscape, thus indirectly cutting back private enforcement more
generally from the legal landscape. Such limitations may be
appropriate and necessary correctives to an integrated system of
private and public regulation in some instances. However, the
reduction of private mechanisms of enforcement too frequently
occurs with little attention by the courts to the role of those
mechanisms in the achievement of particular regulatory objectives. 
II. EFFORTS TO CURTAIL MECHANISMS OF PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT
Efforts to curtail mechanisms of private enforcement have come
from a number of fronts: tort reform; restrictions on the class action
device; the recalibration of procedural mechanisms through private
contract to discourage or impair private suits; the introduction of a
heightened “plausibility” pleading standard for all cases brought in
federal court; and federal preemption of state law claims them-
selves, just to name a few. Spurred by discontent with the private
litigation system, many of these reform measures seek not simply
to change our system of private litigation but to eliminate private
2004).
96. Berner v. Lazzaro, 730 F.2d 1319, 1322 (9th Cir. 1984); see also Steven M. Davidoff
& David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government’s Response to the Financial Crisis, 61
ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 503-04 (2009) (“The staffing and budget of the S.E.C. have lagged far
behind the explosive growth of the markets the commission must police.”); Norman S. Poser,
Why the SEC Failed: Regulators Against Regulation, 3 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 289,
321 (2009) (“[I]t is clear that no matter how much money is appropriated, the SEC will never
have enough resources to adequately protect investors against fraud, manipulation, and
inadequate or inaccurate corporate disclosure.”). 
97. Again, to recognize private parties’ role in the regulatory landscape is not to specify
precisely optimal levels of enforcement but rather to reveal their integral role in the
enforcement of laws beyond some minimal level achievable by constrained public agencies. 
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litigation entirely or in large part. To be sure, any given private
enforcement mechanism may, in the context of a particular regu-
latory regime, be unnecessary and even distortive. But, the reform
efforts discussed below tend to be far reaching and context neutral;
in other words, they often cut back at private enforcement with no
regard for the particular exigencies of a given regulatory framework. 
A. Tort Reform Efforts
Tort reform measures have been at the forefront of a number of
legislative agendas, state and federal, for at least two decades.98
Many politicians demand it; entire organizations exist to lobby
for it; websites, such as Overlawyered.com,99 cry for it. And not for
nothing: common criticisms of the tort system are that its costs do
not correspond meaningfully with compensation to victims of harms,
that “runaway juries” hand out vastly disproportionate and overly
punitive awards to sympathetic and perhaps undeserving plaintiffs,
that tort litigation increases insurance premiums for all, that the
threat of litigation stunts innovation, and that tort litigation harms
businesses in general.100 Although some tort reform measures target
substantive laws explicitly, by redefining existing rights in narrower
terms, many are more indirect; they leave the existing right in place
but cut back at its enforcement mechanisms—or, as Pamela Karlan
puts it, “the remedial machinery.”101 To be sure, some of these
mechanisms may in fact need to be limited to avoid undesirable
regulatory consequences. That said, overly sweeping reform may
impair the critical function of private litigation in the enforcement
of substantive regulatory regimes.102
Tort reform measures that limit mechanisms of private enforce-
ment, both proposed and enacted, abound. Numerous states have
98. See, e.g., Rachel M. Janutis, The Struggle over Tort Reform and the Overlooked Legacy
of the Progressives, 39 AKRON L. REV. 943, 944 (2006). 
99. OVERLAWYERED: CHRONICLING THE HIGH COST OF OUR LEGAL SYSTEM, http://www.
overlawyered.com (last visited Feb. 17, 2012).
100. See, e.g., THE PUB. POLICY INST. OF N.Y. STATE, “AN ACCIDENT AND A DREAM”: HOW THE
LAWSUIT LOTTERY IS DISTORTING JUSTICE AND COSTING NEW YORKERS BILLIONS OF DOLLARS
EVERY YEAR 2 (1998), available at http://bcnys.org/ppi/acccont.htm. 
101. See Karlan, supra note 11, at 185.
102. See Shavell, supra note 58, at 366-67 (noting that private plaintiffs are better situated
than public regulators, in some circumstances, to regulate tort-based harm). 
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enacted reforms, including caps on noneconomic damages, changes
in standards of proof, and restrictions on the availability of punitive
damages.103 As just one example, Oklahoma has enacted or proposed
a number of significant changes to liability rules, restrictions on
remedies, and procedural changes in the last decade. Examples of
these changes include a requirement that potential class members
opt in to a class,104 as well as a $300,000 cap on noneconomic dam-
ages “regardless of the number of parties against whom the action
is brought or the number of actions brought” unless the court finds
gross negligence or intentionality and malice beyond a reasonable
doubt.105 Empirical studies demonstrate that, across the United
States, such measures have resulted in a significant drop both in
the number of cases filed and the number of claims paid.106 
B. Restrictions on the Class Action Device 
Perhaps no other procedural device has received more scholarly
attention than the class action. The modern class action facilitates
the aggregation of small claims that are not economically viable on
an individual basis;107 realigns asymmetric investment incentives
103. For instance, as of 2010, “thirty states, the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico” have laws
limiting “jury awards in malpractice cases,” according to the National Conference of State
Legislatures. Robbie Brown, Ruling Strikes Down Georgia’s Cap on Malpractice Awards, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 23, 2010, at A19 (citing NCSL report). 
104. S.B. 1467, 51st Leg., 2d Sess. § 11 (Okla. 2008).
105. Id. § 19. 
106. See, e.g., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, Tort and Contract Caseloads in State Trial
Courts, in EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS 26, 26-32 (2001), http://www.ncsconline.
org/D_Research/csp/2001_Files/2001_Tort-Contract.pdf (reporting a 10 percent decline in tort
filings from 1991-2000 in thirty states studied, not including Oklahoma); Ronen Avraham, An
Empirical Study of the Impact of Tort Reforms on Medical Malpractice Settlement Payments,
36 J. LEGAL STUD. 5183, 5206 (2007) (providing state-level statistical analysis of medical
malpractice claims nationwide from 1991-1998 and finding that “caps on pain and suffering
damages reduce the number of cases by 10-13 percent” and that “[r]eforming joint and several
liability decreases the number of cases by 8-9 percent”); Bernard Black, et al., Stability, Not
Crisis: Medical Malpractice Claim Outcomes in Texas, 1988-2002, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
207, 210 (2005) (finding that the number of paid medical malpractice claims in Texas declined
from 6.4 per 100 practicing Texas physicians per year in 1990-1992 to “4.6 per 100 practicing
Texas physicians per year in 2000-2002” after the enactment of tort reform measures);
Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, The Strange Success of Tort Reform, 53 EMORY L.J. 1225,
1225 (2004) (reporting a 24.8 percent drop in “new tort cases filed in the Texas trial courts”
from 1995-2001).
107. See Linda Silberman, The Vicissitudes of the American Class Action—With a
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often present in one-on-one litigation; and enables enforcement of
large-scale, market-wide wrongs.108 The class action device has
evolved as a central mechanism of enforcement for a broad range of
laws, including those governing products liability, securities fraud,
consumer fraud, and antitrust violations.109 It has also been invoked
in attempts to address a wide spectrum of alleged harms, from
allegations of smoking-related injuries110 to allegations that the U.S.
government failed to provide adequate medical treatment to troops
wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan.111 
The significant role the class action plays is fully consistent with
the American regulatory regime described in Part I. Modern class
action practice emerged at the same time that the American
regulatory system was coming to rely more on private enforcement
of a number of laws,112 and the practice accordingly developed in
response to the inability of centralized government institutions to
comprehensively address a number of widespread wrongs.113 As
Chief Justice Burger recognized, “[t]he aggregation of individual
claims in the context of a classwide suit is an evolutionary response
to the existence of injuries unremedied by the regulatory action of
government.”114 The class action device also evolved in response to
what one scholar has termed the “massification” phenomenon,
wherein “human actions and relationships assume a collective,
rather than a merely individual, character.”115 
Comparative Eye, 7 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 201, 201-02 (1999) (“[Since] its inception, group
litigation—in particular the [modern] class action—was perceived as a device to empower
individuals in affording them access to justice.”). 
108. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed
Opportunities of Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 19 (2010) (describing the class device as
being capable of generating “an industry-changing event”). 
109. See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond Protection: Invigorating Incentives for
Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate and Securities Fraud Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. REV. 91, 101-02
(2007); William W. Schwarzer, Structuring Multiclaim Litigation: Should Rule 23 Be Revised?,
94 MICH. L. REV. 1250, 1250 (1996).
110. See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 734, 737 (5th Cir. 1996).
111. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Under United States Constitution
and Rehabilitation Act at 9, Veterans for Common Sense v. Nicholson, No. C-07-3758 (N.D.
Cal. July 23, 2007). 
112. See supra Part I.
113. See supra Part I.B.2.
114. Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980).
115. Mauro Cappelletti, Vindicating the Public Interest Through the Courts: A
Comparativist’s Contribution, 25 BUFF. L. REV. 643, 646 (1976). 
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Given the modern class action’s expansive reach, it is wholly
unsurprising that it has been criticized by scholars, courts, and
practitioners alike. In fact, almost as soon as the 1966 revisions to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23116 were promulgated, both the
popular and business presses were flooded with complaints about
excessive litigation under Rule 23(b)(3) and the attendant burdens
on courts and corporations.117
Not long after the 1966 revisions, the Court began to limit class
action practice, primarily by requiring plaintiffs’ attorneys to bear
the often significant costs of providing notice to all prospective class
members under Rule 23(b)(3).118 And in the late 1990s, the Court
imposed restrictions on the certification of classes in the settlement
context, limiting the ability of class actions to achieve globalized
peace in situations of mass harm.119 
Partly in response to industry pressure, Congress too has limited
the reach of the class action device. In 2005, Congress enacted the
Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), which amended the diversity
jurisdiction statute in order to bring more class actions—often
those involving issues of national significance120—out of state court
and into federal court.121 Although the motivation for the CAFA
116. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (governing class actions).
117. James M. Underwood, Rationality, Multiplicity & Legitimacy: Federalization of the
Interstate Class Action, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 391, 400 (2004).
118. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 176-77 (1974). Further, the Court required
plaintiffs’ attorneys to provide notice to all prospective class members early in the
litigation—before any financial payoff could be realized. Id. at 177-79; see also Snyder v.
Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 335 (1969); cf. Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 291 (1973)
(requiring each class member to satisfy the jurisdictional amount for suits in federal court).
119. Specifically, in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997), the Court
refused to let a class settlement tied to a request for class certification go forward when some
among the group of plaintiffs appeared to have been bargained away in favor of other
plaintiffs in order to reach a global settlement. Id. at 617, 620-21. The Court emphasized that
neither the predominance inquiry under Rule 23(b)(3) nor the requirement of adequate
representation is satisfied when the settlement reflects the high likelihood of collusion
between class counsel and defendants’ attorneys. Id. at 628.
120. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Commentary, Overruling Erie: Nationwide Class Actions
and National Common Law, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2135, 2138 (2008) (“[In enacting] CAFA,
Congress intentionally and explicitly sought to ... place[ ]cases involving the national economy
into the federal courts.”); Tobias Barrington Wolff, Federal Jurisdiction and Due Process in
the Era of the Nationwide Class Action, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2035, 2111 (2008) (“The
unavoidable import of CAFA ... is that class actions of national scope and importance should
be decided in a federal tribunal.”). 
121. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(a)(4), (b), 119 Stat. 4, 5
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is debated, legislative history indicates that some members of
Congress supported it because they thought that entrusting to
federal judges the question of class certification—the decision that
generally triggers the end point of class litigation, given the
certification decision’s unique impact on settlement pressure122—
would result in fewer certifications overall.123 
The most recent and controversial efforts to restrict the class
action have come from private parties, who have used arbitration
agreements—often contained in consumer, employment, and fran-
chise contracts—to ban the use of class-wide dispute resolution.124
As other scholars and I have noted, these waivers emerged in the
wake of the Supreme Court’s burgeoning jurisprudence under the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),125 which gives little heed to the Act’s
history regarding its scope.126 Building on its proclamation in 1983
that the FAA sets forth a “liberal federal policy favoring arbi-
tration agreements,”127 the Supreme Court, in a series of decisions,
expanded the FAA’s reach to statutory claims128 and to franchise,
consumer, and employee contracts of adhesion,129 which both the
Court and Congress once considered as beyond the FAA’s reach.130 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1711 (2006)).
122. See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting
that the certification of a class of claims can place defendants “under intense pressure to
settle”).
123. See Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and Its Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure,
Class-Wide Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872, 1912-13 (2006). 
124. David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 439-40 & n.16 (2011).
125. See, e.g., id. at 437; Glover, supra note 11, at 1740-42. 
126. See Glover, supra note 11, at 1740; see also Karlan, supra note 11, at 204 (noting that
Congress likely meant to exclude employment contracts from FAA § 1). 
127. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
128. In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985), the
Supreme Court changed course from a number of earlier decisions, in which it had refused to
order arbitration of numerous statutory claims. See Horton, supra note 124, at 439, 441, 452.
129. See Gilles, supra note 11, at 393-96; Glover, supra note 11, at 1740-41, 1761-63. In
January of 2012, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) ruled that requiring employees
to sign mandatory arbitration agreements that prohibited employees from filing class actions
for claims regarding wages, hours, or working conditions violated the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA). D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184 (Jan. 3, 2012). Until resolved
on a likely appeal, the extent of employers’ ability to use mandatory arbitration agreements
is in question. 
130. Early uses of arbitration were generally limited to contracts between businesses or
between management and unions, consistent with congressional intent behind the FAA. See
Horton, supra note 124, at 439. Legislative history reveals that the Act was not intended to
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As the Court’s FAA jurisprudence expanded, so did corporations’
use of arbitration agreements in “form contracts, mail inserts,
shrink-wrap licenses, and the like.”131 These contracts required con-
sumers, employees, patients, and others to agree ex ante to resolve
future claims through arbitration rather than through litigation.”132
In line with a larger trend toward contractual tailoring of proce-
dural mechanisms to optimize one side’s substantive outcomes,133
these contracts often banned class-wide arbitration. Some scholars
argue that potential defendants, keenly aware of the class action’s
significant impact on the economics of claiming, use mandatory
arbitration and prohibitions on the class device to eliminate private
enforcement altogether.134
In a recent 5-4 decision, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the
Supreme Court held that the use of state unconscionability law, to
which courts have turned pursuant to section 2 of the FAA, to
declare some class action waivers unenforceable, is preempted by
the FAA.135 Although it remains to be seen whether arbitration is
claimant friendly—at least pursuant to AT&T’s particular arbitra-
tion clause, which contains provisions designed to address criticisms
that arbitration is too costly for consumers136—one thing is quite
apply to parties, such as consumers and employees, who possessed unequal bargaining power.
See Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal Commercial
Arbitration: Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 67th Cong. 3 (1923) [hereinafter Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214] (statement of Mr.
Charles L. Bernheimer, cotton goods merchant). In fact, when Senator Walsh expressed
concern that arbitration contracts might be “offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis to captive
customers or employees,” he was assured by the bill’s supporters that they had no such
intention. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 414 (1967) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (describing the hearing). Moreover, W.H.H. Piatt, one of the bill’s key supporters,
stated that he “would not favor any kind of legislation that would permit ... forcing a man to
sign [a take-it-or-leave-it] contract,” and that an arbitration clause “is a contract between
merchants one with another, buying and selling goods.” Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214,
supra, at 10 (statement of W.H.H. Piatt, attorney). Further, Mr. Piatt also stated that “[i]t is
not intended that this shall be an act referring to labor disputes ... at all.” Id. at 9 (statement
of W.H.H. Piatt, attorney).
131. Glover, supra note 11, at 1741.
132. See id.
133. See infra Part II.C.
134. Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the
Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 11 (2000); Glover, supra note 11, at 1738,
1748. 
135. 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011).
136. For instance, AT&T’s “third-generation” arbitration clause provides that AT&T will
2012]    PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS IN PUBLIC LAW 1167
clear under the current landscape: the class action mechanism will
not be available to most consumers, employees, or franchisees whose
contracts are governed by arbitration clauses with class waivers.
Indeed, as of 2005, class action waivers were present in virtually all
areas of contemporary class action practice: consumer cases;
antitrust cases; civil rights, employment and entitlement cases;
“other” commercial cases, such as insurance cases; and securities
fraud cases.137 A recent study of contracts imposed by financial ser-
vices and telecommunications firms on their customers found
that 75 percent contained mandatory arbitration clauses, and 80
percent contained class action waivers.138 Moreover, a stunning 93
percent of these companies’ employment agreements mandated
arbitration.139 And as the dissenting Justices in Concepcion recog-
nized, individual arbitration, even if consumer-friendly, is likely an
inadequate mechanism for bringing small claims.140 As such, to the
extent the class action mechanism is necessary to private regulation
of wrongdoing,141 such waivers may subvert the operation of
significant portions of our regulatory state.
C. Procedural Private Ordering to Discourage Suit
Class action waivers are an instantiation of a more unified
phenomenon: the systematic customization by private parties of
procedural mechanisms through which substantive laws would
otherwise be enforced.142 Although so-called “procedural private
ordering” has the potential to produce efficiency gains by precluding
cover initial arbitration fees and will pay an additional amount ($5000) to consumers who
receive an award in arbitration that exceeds AT&T’s last settlement offer. Petition for a Writ
of Certiorari app. C at 58a-60a, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (No.
09-09-893).
137.  Gilles, supra note 11, at 414, 417-21.
138. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg et al., Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical
Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 871, 882-84 (2008). But see Christopher R. Drahozal & Quentin R. Wittlock,
Franchising, Arbitration, and the Future of the Class Action, 3 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J.
275, 278 (2009) (disputing some of this empirical evidence). 
139. Eisenberg et al., supra note 138, at 883.
140. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1760-61 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
141. See infra Part III.C-D.
142. See Jaime Dodge, The Limits of Procedural Private Ordering, 97 VA. L. REV. 723, 728,
731 (2011).
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ex post cost escalations, such provisions can also enable substantial
circumvention of the drafting party’s exposure to liability under
substantive law.143 This concern is by no means abstract. Courts
typically invalidate such terms, if at all, only when they directly
contravene a procedure expressly provided for in a statute or when
they prevent the bringing of a claim or defense in the first place.144
Moreover, contractual provisions that modify or eliminate proce-
dural devices tend to be evaluated and enforced in a context-neutral
way, with little regard for particular substantive regulatory con-
sequences.145
Consequently, to the extent parties desire to commoditize pro-
cedure to optimize substantive results to their own advantage,
“almost limitless” methods of modification are available to them.146
For instance, parties have inserted forum selection clauses in
contracts to recalibrate the stakes of litigation by making the filing
of suit prohibitively inconvenient and have also made use of the
following tools: waivers to objections to jurisdiction, statutes of
limitation, and jury trials; provisions to modify filing requirements,
default burdens of proof, and the American rule regarding attorneys’
fees (putting in its place a requirement that the losing party pay the
prevailing party’s fees); and limitations on damages.147 Many of
these provisions are designed to change the stakes of litigation and
therefore discourage suit in the first place.148
The use of procedural private ordering has also enabled entities
to export the lenient law of a particular state onto nonresidents,
effectively immunizing them from suit and, by extension, from any
meaningful form of regulation.149 As an example, banks and credit
card companies use choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses to
ensure the export of lenient state law—law that frequently provides
143. See id. at 725. 
144. In fact, since the Supreme Court’s decision in Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S.
585, 591 (1991), in which the Court created “a presumption of enforceability” for such
contractual provisions, the Court has not found that “a procedural contract violates
fundamental fairness.” Dodge, supra note 142, at 735-36.
145. Dodge, supra note 142, at 728, 731-32.
146. Michael L. Moffitt, Customized Litigation: The Case for Making Civil Procedure
Negotiable, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 461, 465 (2007). 
147. Dodge, supra note 142, at 746-48.
148. Id. 
149. Id. at 741-43.
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these entities a wide berth to engage in undesirable conduct or that
imposes strict damages restrictions, thereby discouraging private
suits.150 These clauses, in concert with the permissive regulatory
regime that emerged under the National Bank Act (NBA), provide
financial institutions an environment largely unregulated by private
parties and, at least until quite recently, largely unregulated by
public institutions. 
In particular, section 85 of the NBA permits banks to charge
“interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the State, Territory, or
District where the bank is located.”151 The Supreme Court inter-
preted the term “located” to mean that a bank is accountable to the
laws of the state in which it is chartered, even if it conducts its
commercial activities in other areas throughout the country.152
Unsurprisingly, banks and credit card companies quickly relocated
to a handful of states—primarily South Dakota and Delaware—
with favorable legal regimes, including the absence of usury regu-
lations.153 After the Supreme Court later adopted the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency’s (OCC) interpretation of the term
“interest” as including any charges associated with credit card
usage,154 financial institutions existed in a regulatory safe haven:
liability for imposing unduly high rates, confusing variable interest
rates, and hidden and/or exorbitant late fees has been largely
precluded by the exportation into the national market of the lax law
of two outlier states. Virtually all state banks have now converted
to federal charters to avail themselves of this exportation regime,155
150. See Scott J. Burnham, Contractual Relations in Small Business: Do the Benefits of a
Custom-Made Contract Outweigh the Costs?, 7 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 425, 428-29
(2003); Erin Ann O’Hara, Opting Out of Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis of Contractual
Choice of Law, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1551, 1556 (2000).
151. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2006).
152. See Marquette Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299,
310-13 (1978).
153. See Samuel Issacharoff & Erin F. Delaney, Credit Card Accountability, 73 U. CHI. L.
REV. 157, 160-61 (2006).
154. See Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 746-47 (1996). Since the Supreme
Court’s decision in Smiley, the OCC has declared that interest includes, among other things,
“numerical periodic rates, late fees, creditor-imposed not sufficient funds (NSF) fees ...
overlimit fees, annual fees, cash advance fees, and membership fees.” 12 C.F.R. § 7.4001(a)
(2005).
155. JP Morgan Chase, HSBC, and the Bank of Montreal together moved $1 trillion in
assets from state-regulated banking systems to federal systems. Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth
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and these entities have inserted choice-of-law and choice-of-forum
clauses in their contracts with consumers to ensure application of
the favorable law.156 The recent congressional overhaul of consumer
finance law in 2009 and 2010 does nothing to change this exporta-
tion regime.157
Provisions that circumscribe the availability of procedural mech-
anisms or that shift liability in favor of the drafting party do not
appear at random. Rather, one tends to find them in particular
types of contracts, such as consumer and employment contracts (as
opposed to commercial contracts, in which sophisticated parties tend
to maximize equally the value of their transactions).158 As scholars
have recognized, this reality raises concerns regarding disparities
in bargaining power.159 However, the landscape of asymmetric
procedural private ordering portends more fundamental problems:
these provisions frequently appear in areas of the law arguably in
most need of private, ex post mechanisms of enforcement, and the
use of these provisions will in many instances undermine signifi-
cantly the policing of wrongdoing within those regulatory schemes.
D. Heightened Pleading Standards 
Through two recent decisions, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly160 and
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,161 the Supreme Court replaced the notice pleading
regime under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that had been
perceived as settled for decades162 with a new “plausibility” pleading
standard for all cases in federal court.163 The decision in Twombly
Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 82-83 (2008). And in 2006, the Bank of
New York, one of the largest remaining state banks, sold its 338 retail branches to J.P.
Morgan Chase. Id. at 83.
156. See Burnham, supra note 150, at 425, 429. 
157. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.).
158. See Gilles, supra note 11, at 412-13 & n.222.
159. See id. at 399, 418.
160. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
161. 129 S. Ct. 1937.
162. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45 (1957) (stating that a claim should not be
dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) unless “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief”).
163. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562-64 (abrogating the “no set of facts” standard articulated in
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)); see also Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (making clear that the
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has been lauded for bringing long-overdue reworking of overly
permissive pleading standards.164 It has at the same time been
criticized on a number of fronts—as an impermissible exercise of the
judiciary’s power, as a proclamation of an impossibly vague and
unwieldy standard, and as an outright assault on private liti-
gation.165 
At bottom, these decisions are at least defensible on the grounds
that they correctly identify a problem of modern litigation. The costs
associated with an expansive discovery regime embodied in the
Federal Rules may generate significant settlement pressure even if
the defendants did nothing wrong and are ultimately likely to be
exonerated.166 In some regulatory regimes, particularly those in
which potential plaintiffs can reasonably be expected to have access
to factual information about their claims sufficient to state a
“plausible” claim,167 this heightening of the pleading mechanism
standard may serve as a more effective screener of meritless cases
before they proceed to the frequently settlement-extracting discov-
ery phase of litigation. But, because the new “plausibility” pleading
standard applies broadly,168 it is likely that in some significant
subset of cases the new standard will sweep too broadly and simply
remove from the regulatory landscape a number of potentially
meritorious lawsuits. To the extent private enforcement plays an
“plausibility” pleading standard articulated in Twombly applies to all complaints filed in
federal court under Rule 8(a)(2)).
164. See Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become
(Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 61, 62 (2007) (welcoming the
decision, though criticizing its analysis). 
165. See, e.g., Hillel Y. Levin, Iqbal, Twombly, and the Lessons of the Celotex Trilogy, 14
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 143, 152 (2010) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s plausibility standard is
extraordinarily vague.”); Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play
on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 8-9 (2010) (arguing that the fear of
excessive discovery costs is hurting the ability of an average person to have her day in court);
Suja A. Thomas, Why the Motion to Dismiss Is Now Unconstitutional, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1851,
1855 (2008) (arguing that the new regime violates the Seventh Amendment’s limits on judicial
and congressional power over juries). 
166. See J. Maria Glover, The Federal Rules of Civil Settlement 15-20 (Oct. 20, 2011)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (noting, however, that settlement pressure was
likely not a potential issue in Iqbal, making the case a particularly poor vehicle for broadening
a pleading standard designed in part to reduce such pressure). 
167. See id. at 49.
168. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (extending Twombly’s “plausibility” standard to all
complaints filed in federal court under Rule 8(a)(2)).
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important role in the achievement of a given set of regulatory
objectives for any of those cases, this heightened pleading standard
will undermine the functioning of those regulatory regimes.
E. Preemption of State Law Claims 
Another controversial effort to reduce mechanisms of private
regulation—this time, state common law claims—is not achieved
through the elimination or direct alteration of such claims under
common law but through federal preemption.169 To be sure, preemp-
tion of state law claims is sometimes needed and appropriate,
particularly in the context of a comprehensive public regulatory
scheme. Indeed, as proponents of preemption argue, national
markets may “demand uniformity” in the interpretation of federal
regulations across the United States;170 preemption can help
circumvent negative spillover effects, whereby one experimenting or
perhaps aberrant state shifts costs in favor of its own citizens;171 and
preemption can prevent unfairness to businesses that have complied
with federal regulations only to face unpredictable and conflicting
liability under state law.172 On the other hand, opponents of
preemption argue that removal of state law tort liability from the
regulatory landscape dilutes incentives for manufacturers to design
safe products or to inform consumers about dangers,173 compels
national uniformity while “stifling state-by-state diversity and
169. See David A. Kessler & David C. Vladeck, A Critical Examination of the FDA’s Efforts
to Preempt Failure-to-Warn Claims, 96 GEO. L.J. 461, 464 (2008).
170. Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 1353, 1369 (2006).
171. See id. at 1370; see also Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition,
Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1222 (1992) (“The presence of interstate externalities is a powerful
reason for intervention at the federal level.”). 
172. See Susan J. Stabile, Preemption of State Law by Federal Law: A Task for Congress
or the Courts?, 40 VILL. L. REV. 1, 13-14 (1995).
173. See, e.g., Micah L. Berman, Smoking Out the Impact of Tobacco-Related Decisions on
Public Health Law, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 40 (2009) (“[I]mmunity from tort litigation ... removes
a major incentive for manufacturers to make their products as safe as possible or to alert
consumers to newly-discovered dangers.”); Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 169, at 476 (noting
that preemption of failure-to-warn claims removes incentives for drug manufacturers to
update labels). 
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experimentation,”174 and provides de facto immunity for regulated
entities.175 And these latter concerns are particularly pronounced
vis-à-vis the meaningful regulation of wrongdoing if the overall
regulatory scheme in which an entity operates is not comprehensive.
Preemption issues appear all across the regulatory landscape.176
Moreover, statements on preemption are not just the province of
Congress and the courts. In recent years, federal agencies have
attempted, albeit somewhat unsuccessfully, to expand preemption
through statements in regulations. In particular, during George W.
Bush’s administration, various federal agencies included statements
in the preambles of their regulations indicating the agency’s view
that such regulations should preempt all state law claims in the
regulated field.177 
174. Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 130
(2004). 
175. See, e.g., Eva B. Stensvad, Immunity for Vaccine Manufacturers: The Vaccine Act and
Preemption of Design Defect Claims, 95 MINN. L. REV. 315, 315 (2010).
176. For instance, the Medical Device Act expressly provides that states may not maintain
device requirements “different from, or in addition to” the FDA’s requirements. 21 U.S.C.
§ 360k(a)(1) (2006). The Court has interpreted this language as preempting not only state
regulatory measures, but state tort law as well. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312,
323-24 (2008) (holding that plaintiffs’ claims that a device manufacturer’s catheters were not
reasonably safe under state tort law were preempted); Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal
Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 343-44 (2001) (holding as preempted plaintiffs’ claims that they had
been injured by orthopedic bone screws and that the manufacturer of those screws had made
fraudulent misrepresentations to the FDA in the course of obtaining market approval). The
Court has so held despite the fact that the FDA approves pharmaceuticals based solely on
information provided by the manufacturer, see Brief for the States of New York et al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 17, Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008) (No. 06-
179), which in turn is based on few clinical trials (perhaps only one), see DAVID C. VLADECK,
AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y FOR LAW & POLICY, THE EMERGING THREAT OF REGULATORY
PREEMPTION 6-8 (2008), available at http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Vladeck_Issue_
Brief.pdf. Once on the market, these products are subject to very limited ongoing supervision
by the FDA. David C. Vladeck, Preemption and Regulatory Failure, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 95, 128
(2005).
177. See Sharkey, supra note 4, at 227. For instance, in its January 2006 prescription drug
labeling rule, the FDA stated that “FDA approval of labeling under the act ... preempts
conflicting or contrary State law.” Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for
Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934 (Jan. 24, 2006)
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, 601). In that same year, the CPSC handed down
rules regarding bedding and mattress fire safety and stated within those rules that
“inconsistent state standards and requirements, whether in the form of positive enactments
or court created requirements” are preempted. Final Rule: Standard for Flammability (Open
Flame) of Mattress Sets, 71 Fed. Reg. 13,472, 13,496 (Mar. 15, 2006) (to be codified at 16
C.F.R. pt. 1633). For the time being, it is unclear how effective such statements will be in
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In essence, preemption shapes the regulatory environment for
most major industries—including, for instance, drugs and medical
devices, tobacco, banking, air transportation, securities, automo-
biles, and boats.178 And for many regulatory regimes, preemption is
necessary to ensure, for instance, national uniformity of standards
in certain industries and to prevent the imposition of negative
spillover effects by one state on out-of-state defendants.179 That said,
evaluation of whether state law causes of action are preempted
within any given regulatory regime should also consider the ways
in which that regime is changed by the absence of private litigation.
In small pockets of the law, such considerations are being made. In
the wake of the recent financial crisis, Congress enacted a bill that
takes steps to roll back preemption both of state law claims and
state administrative regulation of national banks, with the pur-
pose of strengthening the regulatory regime in which these institu-
tions operate.180 In many instances, however, such systemic con-
siderations are given short shrift, either by Congress or by the
Court, through strict applications of preemption doctrines.181 The
influencing the courts on preemption. Recently, the Supreme Court, in Wyeth v. Levine, 555
U.S. 555 (2009), over a vigorous dissent, id. at 604-29 (Alito, J., dissenting), made clear that
the FDA’s preemptive statement, because it was expressed in a regulatory preamble, was not
entitled to deference. Id. at 577 (majority opinion). This decision, combined with a recent
memorandum to federal agencies from President Obama, Memorandum on Preemption, 2009
DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 384 (May 20, 2009), available at http://whitehouse.gov/the_press
_office/Presidential-Memorandum-Regarding-Preemption, indicates that—at the very least—
administrative agencies must not issue statements on preemption so “silently” but rather
must do so through more formal procedures such as the notice-and-comment process.
178. On drugs and medical devices, see, for example, Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 555; Riegel, 552
U.S. at 312; Buckman Co., 531 U.S. at 341; Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996). On
tobacco, see, for example, Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70 (2008); Lorillard Tobacco Co.
v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992). On
banking, see, for example, Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1 (2007); Barnett Bank
v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996). On air transportation, see, for example, American Airlines, Inc.
v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219 (1995). On securities, see, for example, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71 (2006); Dahl v. Charles Schwab & Co., 545 N.W.2d 918
(Minn. 1996); Guice v. Charles Schwab & Co., 674 N.E.2d 282 (N.Y. 1996). On automobiles,
see, for example, Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000). On boats, see, for
example, Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51 (2002).
179. See Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 170, at 1369-70.
180. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.).
181. The Court’s recent decision in Pliva, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011), illustrates
the way that preemption doctrines largely fail to accommodate these systemic concerns. In
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combination of a diffuse regulatory system, frequently functionally
reliant on ex post regulation by private parties for the effectuation
of particular substantive aims, on the one hand, and the curtailment
of private enforcement mechanisms on the other, raises fundamen-
tal questions about whether and to what extent such restrictions
threaten a given regulatory regime. Moreover, the frequently con-
text-neutral approach to such restrictions impedes the needed
integration of regulatory objectives among enforcement channels.
Accordingly, the following Part presents the elements of a frame-
work for evaluating and tailoring appropriate private enforcement
mechanisms in light of the exigencies of a particular regulatory
scheme. This framework will guide courts, legislatures, and when
appropriate, administrative agencies in more completely harmoniz-
ing various enforcement efforts with underlying regulatory goals.
Pliva, patients who had taken a generic form of the drug Reglan and had later suffered
tardive dyskinesia filed suit under state law against the generic manufacturer, alleging that
it had failed to update the drug’s warning labels to reflect recent evidence of this potential
severe side effect. Id. at 2572-73. The applicable state laws—those of Louisiana and
Minnesota—required manufacturers of all drugs, including generics, to provide up-to-date
warnings based on scientific evidence of the drug’s potentially harmful effects. Federal law,
however, required that a generic drug’s warnings should match those of the brand name drug.
Id. at 2573. The majority held that the federal drug regulations directly conflicted with the
relevant state law because it was impossible for manufacturers to comply with both laws. Id.
at 2577. The impossibility preemption doctrine left little room for the consideration of the
systemic concerns raised by the majority’s holding; indeed, the majority simply noted that “it
is not this Court’s task to decide whether the statutory scheme ... is unusual or even bizarre.”
Id. at 2582 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). In her dissent, Justice
Sotomayor argued that preemption doctrines must take into account the more systemic
consequences of removing private enforcement mechanisms from this particular regulatory
scheme. Id. at 2582-93 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Specifically, Justice Sotomayor contended
that the majority’s holding “create[d] a gap in the parallel federal-state regulatory scheme in
a way that could have troubling consequences for drug safety,” noting that state tort suits
provided a crucial complement to FDA regulation by “uncover[ing] unknown drug hazards and
provid[ing] incentives for drug manufacturers to disclose safety risks promptly.” Id. at 2592
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Even if the appropriate application of
the impossibility preemption doctrine, as it currently exists, tracks the majority’s inter-
pretation, the decision in Pliva highlights a serious deficiency in both that doctrine and in the
design and function of the regulatory regime for prescription drugs—namely, that neither
successfully integrates within a system of diffuse regulation the relevant objectives of
protecting and warning patients and of treating regulated entities, both producers of brand-
name and generic drugs, equally, as Congress intended. 
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 III. A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTEGRATING PRIVATE  
MECHANISMS OF ENFORCEMENT INTO REGULATORY REGIMES
Parts I and II have argued that private enforcement is integral to
our larger system of public regulation. Indeed, such public regula-
tion could not exist as it does without such enforcement. And as
scholars have recognized, the American regulatory state requires a
level of investment in the private legal system in order to ensure
that substantive laws are enforced and to achieve deterrence of
wrongdoing.182 
Of course, maximum enforcement of any given regulatory scheme
is both unnecessary and frequently not optimal. Private enforce-
ment has the potential to disrupt regulatory schemes by generating,
among other things, excessive overall enforcement.183 And even in
a diffuse system of regulation, there are myriad reasons within
specific regulatory regimes that enforcement mechanisms are better
entrusted to public regulatory bodies.184 
That said, efforts to curtail private mechanisms of enforcement
sweep too broadly and without attention to the ways in which
various private enforcement mechanisms interact with the overall
regulatory goals.185 Therefore, they may leave in place insufficient
ex post accountability in various substantive areas of American law.
Rigorous analysis of the role private enforcement mechanisms play
in a given regulatory regime has been obscured both in doctrine and
in scholarship by the tendency to formulate acontextual, abstract
metrics for the evaluation of such mechanisms,186 and by normative
182. See, e.g., Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 10, at 1201-02.
183. See Stephenson, supra note 90, at 114. 
184. See, e.g., Pasachoff, supra note 67, at 1461-65 (arguing that public enforcement of
IDEA is preferable to private enforcement). 
185. See supra Part II.
186. For instance, courts have attempted to construct various metrics to govern class
waivers in particular, and class actions in general, in a largely context-neutral manner. Cases
and materials addressing unconscionability and preemption under the FAA are illustrative.
See, e.g., AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1747-48, 1750-53 (2011);
Laster v. AT&T Mobility L.L.C., 584 F.3d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 2009); Discover Bank v. Superior
Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005); Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless L.L.C., 857 N.E.2d 250,
274-75 (Ill. 2006); Scott v. Cingular Wireless, 161 P.3d 1000, 1007-08 (Wash. 2007); Brief for
Petitioner at 48, AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (No. 09-893); see
also Sternlight, supra note 11, at 21. 
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accounts of these restrictions that focus less on the relationship
between a private enforcement mechanism and the particular
exigencies of a given regulatory scheme and more on the relation-
ship between those mechanisms and a system of private litigation
in general.187 These broad criticisms of private enforcement might
be better understood in some instances, instead, as a call for better
tailoring of the mechanisms of that enforcement to regulatory
exigencies.188 Indeed, the diffuse nature of regulation in the
American system of public law calls for more nuanced approaches
to fundamental questions about the potential insufficiency, or
insufficient tailoring, of ex post private enforcement mechanisms
within specific regulatory schemes—questions that receive little
attention.189
This Part seeks to address these questions more systemically by
setting forth elements of a framework for evaluating private en-
forcement mechanisms that will enable courts, legislatures, and,
where appropriate, administrative agencies, to better tailor private
enforcement mechanisms to the achievement of specific regulatory
objectives. In particular, this Part sets forth four operational criteria
for evaluating these mechanisms of enforcement. 
First, all things being equal, enforcement mechanisms should be
entrusted and tailored to the needs of the regulator with superior
187. See, e.g., Stephen J. Werber, Ohio: A Microcosm of Tort Reform Versus State
Constitutional Mandates, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 1045, 1046-47 (2001) (arguing that tort reform is
needed to protect defendants from frivolous lawsuits); Sternlight, supra note 11, at 19-20
(asking whether class actions are a “good thing” and ultimately concluding that they are). For
an example of context-specific evaluation of tort reform in the area of medical malpractice,
however, see David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, Medical Malpractice Litigation and Tort
Reform: It’s the Incentives, Stupid, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1085, 1089-91, 1107 (2006) (providing
thorough research on the occurrence and success rates of malpractice suits). 
188. For instance, Steven Shavell has argued that public regulation is preferable to private
regulation when harm is dispersed across the population. Shavell, supra note 58, at 363, 370.
However, particularly when public regulatory bodies are ill equipped as a matter of resources
to deal with widespread harm within a given regulatory regime, a mechanism like the class
action or multidistrict litigation (MDL) might be employed. And as discussed below, see infra
text accompanying notes 292-94, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, which expressed concern about private suits resulting in remedial overkill in the
context of antitrust regulation, 550 U.S. 544, 569 n.14 (2007), might be better understood as
issuing a call for more nuanced mechanisms of private enforcement at the pleading stage that
better screen meritless suits. 
189. See infra text accompanying notes 274-75.
1178 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1137
command of information relevant to potential wrongdoing.190
Ideally, such mechanisms should be allocated not only to infor-
mationally superior parties but to those parties who have sufficient
incentives to operationalize that information through enforce-
ment.191 
Second, private enforcement mechanisms should be integrated
with other regulatory efforts when necessary to effectuate the com-
plete range of remedies provided in a given scheme, but carefully
calibrated so as not to generate substantial remedial overkill.192
Third, evaluation of private enforcement mechanisms, particu-
larly under preemption doctrines, should explicitly include consider-
ation of the extent to which those mechanisms are necessary to a
regime’s comprehensive regulation of harm.193 Further, courts, and,
when appropriate, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee or Congress,
should calibrate enforcement mechanisms attendant to state law
claims with a careful eye toward the need to preserve national
uniformity and to prevent the negative spillover effects.194 
Fourth and finally, even when a regulatory scheme allocates
enforcement authority to public regulatory bodies with informa-
tional advantages relative to private parties, and even when a
public regulatory scheme technically provides for complete and com-
prehensive regulation of wrongdoing, to the extent those regimes
are characterized by significant underenforcement and regulatory
failure on the part of the public regulatory body, appropriate en-
forcement mechanisms should be allocated to private parties for the
achievement of regulatory goals.195 
To be clear, this Part does not purport to resolve questions about
whether a system of public regulation in general or with regard to
a particular substantive area is ultimately better than one heavily
reliant on private enforcement. In addition, this Part does not pro-
vide ironclad prescriptions for the precise calibration of any regu-
latory scheme, as such prescriptions necessarily require a balancing
of many of the considerations set forth here. Rather, the goal is to
190. See infra Part III.A.
191. See infra notes 225-39 and accompanying text.
192. See infra Part III.B.
193. See infra Part III.C.
194. See infra Part III.C.
195. See infra Part III.D.
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provide elements of a framework for thinking more systematically
about how to calibrate and design appropriate mechanisms of pri-
vate enforcement within the specific contours of a given regulatory
scheme. The systemic analysis of enforcement mechanisms within
this framework reveals that, in a number of areas of law, there may
be insufficient, or insufficiently nuanced, mechanisms of ex post
enforcement.196 At the same time, with respect to specific regulatory
regimes, some mechanisms of private enforcement may not be as
crucial to a given regulatory landscape as many believe and, in fact,
may generate undesirable regulatory consequences.197
Although this framework does not seek to, nor could it, resolve all
the complex issues of regulatory design present across innumerable
areas of substantive law, it does for the first time situate, within a
larger account of private regulation’s structural role, current efforts
to curtail enforcement mechanisms that support that regulation.198
The conceptual elements presented here thus offer a needed and
more systemic approach to a number of seemingly disparate debates
about private enforcement mechanisms across our legal landscape
—an approach that accounts for the effect of those mechanisms on
the operation of a particular regulatory scheme and thus offers hope
of eventual resolution of these seemingly intractable disputes.
A. Allocating Enforcement Mechanisms to the Regulator with
Superior Information 
All other things being equal, enforcement mechanisms should be
entrusted to the regulator with the best regulatory command of
information relevant to wrongdoing. In particular, evaluating the
need for or design of enforcement mechanisms within a given regu-
latory scheme should involve two related inquiries about informa-
tional advantages as between potential regulators of wrongdoing.
First, as between a potential public and private regulator, courts,
legislatures, and agencies—to the extent an agency exercises regu-
latory supervision over private enforcement199—should ask which
196. See infra Part III.A-D.
197. See infra Part III.B.
198. See supra Part II.
199. See, e.g., Stephenson, supra note 90, at 95-98 (suggesting heightened agency
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potential regulator has better access to, ability to evaluate, and, as
a result, command of the factual information relevant to the alleged
wrongdoing. Second, courts, legislatures, and agencies should deter-
mine whether the actors with superior command of the relevant
information are in fact adequately incentivized to operationalize
that information via enforcement of the underlying substantive law,
and then make adjustments to the relevant enforcement mecha-
nisms as required.200 
Regarding the first inquiry, public regulators will generally have
informational advantages for those regulatory regimes in which
(1) a fairly large set of data is needed for the illumination of poten-
tial wrongdoing,201 (2) comparative analysis of that factual informa-
tion is required or particularly helpful for the discovery of potential
wrongdoing,202 or (3) the information relevant to potential wrong-
doing is of a complex nature such that it is not easily understand-
able by non-experts.203 In such situations, the operation of various
private enforcement mechanisms may not only be unnecessary but
may also disrupt the achievement of regulatory objectives by, for
instance, introducing into the litigation system potentially meritless
lawsuits filed by informationally disadvantaged private plaintiff
regulators.204 On the other hand, private parties will tend to possess
such advantages for those regulatory regimes in which (1) private
supervision of private enforcement initiatives); see also Brian D. Galle, Can Federal Agencies
Authorize Private Suits Under Section 1983? A Theoretical Approach, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 163,
163, 165 (2003) (suggesting that agencies play a greater role in determining whether a private
right of action should be permitted to enforce a “law” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006)).
200. To be sure, the party with superior information will not always be the party best
incentivized to operationalize that information through enforcement efforts, and vice versa.
As this Part discusses, this situation requires careful consideration of a given regulatory
regime’s contours for purposes of allocating mechanisms when such considerations diverge,
and to the extent enforcement must be entrusted to an informationally inferior party to
ensure meaningful regulation under a given scheme, mechanisms must be put in place to cure
informational asymmetries. See infra text accompanying notes 226-39.
201. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 65 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Selmi, supra note 83, at 1409-
10 (noting that potential renters or buyers may not know that they have been the victims of
housing discrimination without comparative information). 
203. See Shavell, supra note 58, at 360 (arguing that public regulation is better when
information related to wrongdoing is “difficult to communicate to private parties because of
its technical nature”).
204. See Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519, 576, 596 (1997)
(arguing that informational asymmetries best explain the filing of meritless suits). 
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individuals, as opposed to public regulators, are geographically close
to the locus of the alleged harm,205 (2) the alleged wrongdoing is
fairly concrete and aimed directly at or knowingly suffered by
private individuals,206 or (3) the potential private-party regulator is
integrated into a market or other structured environment in a way
that gives it first-hand awareness of wrongdoing.207
As an example, consider the regulatory landscape of consumer
finance. The overall consumer credit regulatory landscape is domi-
nated primarily by disclosure laws,208 which are widely criticized as
ineffective both as a means of informing consumers and as a means
of affecting the behavior of consumers or regulated industries.209
Consumers generally do not comprehend such disclosures, nor do
they tend to operationalize such information in a way that might
alter their decision-making processes as market participants210 or
as potential regulators. Indeed, empirical studies show that in-
creased disclosures do not influence consumers in the least.211 And
given these informational disadvantages, even when disclosure suits
are brought, they typically generate no meaningful change in the
operation of the consumer market,212 because disclosed information
205. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
206. See Shavell, supra note 58, at 360 (arguing that private parties enjoy a relative
advantage in knowledge about injuries to themselves and the risks of their activities). 
207. See Stephenson, supra note 90, at 108.
208. See, e.g., Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, 12 U.S.C. § 2801 (2006); Truth in
Savings Act, 12 U.S.C. § 4301 (2006); Truth in Lending Act (TILA) of 1968, 15 U.S.C. § 1601
(amended 2010); Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1704-1705 (2006);
Fair Credit and Charge Card Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 100-583, § 136(b), 102 Stat. 2960,
2967 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
209. See, e.g., Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 155, at 28, 42 (describing numerous studies
that conclude that consumers misunderstand mortgage and credit card disclosures); Jonathan
M. Landers & Ralph J. Rohner, A Functional Analysis of Truth in Lending, 26 UCLA L. REV.
711, 715 (1979) (“Behavioral scientists, public opinion research, [and] consumer research ...
tell us the same thing: consumer behavior in a particular transaction is almost certainly not
going to be affected by a [TILA] disclosure statement, notwithstanding the quality of that
statement.”). 
210. Samuel Issacharoff, Disclosure, Agents, and Consumer Protection 4-7 (NYU Ctr. for
Law, Econ. & Org., Research Paper No. 10-33, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1640624.
211. See Ralph J. Rohner & Thomas A. Durkin, TILA “Finance” and “Other” Charges in
Open-End Credit: The Cost-of-Credit Principle Applied to Charges for Optional Products or
Services, 17 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 137, 145 (2005).
212. For example, studies show that TILA disclosures did almost nothing to correct
consumer error in the mortgage lending market, largely blamed for much of the recent
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does not tend to reveal to consumers, who are looking at a single
credit card statement, practices like predatory lending or the
charging of usurious interest rates.213 The overall landscape is one
in which public regulatory bodies, such as the newly created Bureau
of Consumer Financial Protection (BCFP),214 are likely to have a
significant informational advantages. 
For starters, determining whether financial agencies are engaged
in unlawful practices generally requires a broad-based under-
standing of their financial practices vis-à-vis a number of consum-
ers, not just one isolated consumer.215 Moreover, determining the
nature and scope of potential wrongdoing requires analysis of com-
parative data216—for example, the difference in rates between one
type of consumer and another, or between a business entity and a
consumer. And finally, credit card bills and financial statements are
increasingly technical and difficult for the average consumer to
understand.217 Thus, the expertise of a public regulatory agency is
needed to spot wrongdoing within a labyrinth of complex data. All
other things being equal, mechanisms of enforcement ought there-
fore to be put in place for regulatory enforcement by the BCFP—and
financial crisis. See, e.g., JAMES M. LACKO & JANIS K. PAPPALARDO, FTC BUREAU OF ECON.,
IMPROVING CONSUMER MORTGAGE DISCLOSURES: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT AND
PROTOTYPE DISCLOSURE FORMS 29-30, 121 (2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/06/
P025505MortgageDisclosureReport.pdf (finding that the disclosures misled consumers, that
consumers spent almost no time looking at disclosures, and that consumers never used the
disclosures for their stated purpose).
213. Cf. Selmi, supra note 83, at 1409-10 (explaining that it is difficult for people to know
when they have been victims of housing discrimination because they do not have access to
comparative data).
214. The just-created BCFP, which was given authority to regulate consumer financial
products, may strengthen somewhat the regulatory landscape of consumer finance. See Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1011(a), 124
Stat. 1376, 1964 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.). Importantly,
both Elizabeth Warren and Oren Bar-Gill had significant influence over the formation of this
agency. These two experts recognize the limitations of disclosure laws on correcting consumer
error and understand many of the limitations prior agencies faced in enforcing consumer
protection laws. See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 155, at 100-01 (recommending the creation
of a new federal regulator). For more on the authors’ understanding of these issues, see
generally Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 155.
215. See, e.g., Selmi, supra note 83, at 1409-10.
216. See id.
217. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-929, CREDIT CARDS: INCREASED
COMPLEXITY IN RATES AND FEES HEIGHTENS NEED FOR MORE EFFECTIVE DISCLOSURES TO
CONSUMERS 77-78 (2006), available at www.gao.gov/new.items/d06929.pdf.
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at least in its current form, a fair number of enforcement mecha-
nisms have in fact been entrusted to that bureau (though it took a
massive financial crisis to enact them).218 It is too early to analyze
the effectiveness of this agency and, more fundamentally, to know
whether it will receive the funding necessary to exercise its powers.
But purely as a matter of informational advantage, the creation of
the BCFP is a welcome addition to the regulatory landscape of con-
sumer finance. 
As another example, public regulatory bodies are better posi-
tioned informationally in the context of housing discrimination. It
is particularly difficult for individuals who might have been victims
of such discrimination to ascertain their status as such because, as
a general matter, prospective renters or buyers lack the “necessary
comparative information.”219 For instance, a realtor might inform an
individual that “an apartment has already been rented” in order to
conceal discriminatory animus.220 In general, housing audits play a
crucial role in documenting and revealing housing discrimination;221
this information is typically unavailable to private parties,222 placing
them at a significant informational disadvantage as potential regu-
lators of wrongdoing under statutes such as the Fair Housing Act
(FHA). 
On the other hand, in other regulatory regimes like the FLSA,
employees, as opposed to public regulators, generally possess infor-
218. The BCFP’s powers are broad. It has power over “covered persons,” defined as a
person, or any affiliate of a person, who “engages in offering or providing a consumer financial
product or service,” Dodd-Frank Act § 1002(6), though not over merchants and retailers,
unless they have significantly engaged in “offering or providing any consumer financial
product or service,” or over lawyers, entities regulated by the SEC, or insurance agents. Id.
§ 1027(a), (e), (i), (m). The BCFP also has rulemaking power to prevent “unfair, deceptive, or
abusive [consumer financial] acts or practices,” id. § 1031(b), and it has supervisory and
enforcement power over “nondepository covered persons,” “very large banks, savings
associations, and credit unions,” and “other banks, savings associations, and credit unions.”
Id. §§ 1024-1026. Finally, the BCFP can commence a civil action against “any person” who
violates “[f]ederal consumer financial law.” Id. § 1054(a). Through such an action, the Bureau
can obtain civil penalties of up to one million dollars per day, but the BCFP cannot seek
punitive damages. Id. § 1055. For information regarding the role of the financial crisis in
prompting the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, see Manuel A. Utset, Complex Financial
Institutions and Systemic Risk, 45 GA. L. REV. 779, 781-82 (2011). 
219. See Selmi, supra note 83, at 1409-10.
220. Id. at 1410.
221. Id.
222. See id.
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mational advantages regarding potential wrongdoing. Specifically,
employees protected by the FLSA will usually have the best infor-
mation regarding underpayment of wages or nonpayment of over-
time.223 Employees are, quite obviously, geographically close to any
potential harm at their place of work, and any wrongdoing is
suffered by them directly—they are aware of the hours they have
worked and of the values of their paychecks. As a practical matter,
even if the DOL could obtain wage, hour, and working condition
information as easily as employees, it lacks the resources to do
so—the DOL has resources to investigate less than 1 percent of
FLSA-regulated employers.224 Thus, in the context of the regulatory
regimes such as the FLSA, enforcement mechanisms are better
entrusted, as an informational matter, to private regulators. 
But this is not the end of the analysis. Enforcement mechanisms
should be tailored to the specific characteristics of those parties best
positioned informationally to be potential regulators in a particular
regulatory scheme. For example, the FLSA systematically tends to
generate low-value claims because of the nature of its protected
class: wage-and-hour employees.225 Consequently, to bring about
enforcement of the FLSA by informationally superior private
plaintiffs, mechanisms that facilitate the economics of claiming are
required. Mechanisms already in place under the FLSA include the
fee-shifting provision and the collective action proceeding, whereby
an employee may opt in to a suit on behalf of himself and similarly
situated employees.226 The fee-shifting mechanism is unlikely to
provide sufficient enforcement incentives for anyone other than
individuals possessing high-value claims227—a rarity under the
223. See Ruckelshaus, supra note 45, at 377, 383 (“[T]he DOL conducts its current wage
and hour law enforcement based almost wholly on worker complaints.”).
224. See supra text accompanying note 47.
225. See Philip L. Bartlett II, Disparate Treatment: How Income Can Affect the Level of
Employer Compliance with Employment Statutes, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 419, 474-75
& n.260 (2001).
226. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006). 
227. Fee-shifting provisions also tend not to motivate private attorneys to ferret out
wrongdoing, given (1) doctrinal developments that require suits to generate more than a
voluntary change in a defendant’s conduct for the awarding of fees, Buckhannon Bd. & Care
Home Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001), and that permit
defendants to condition settlement on waiver of such fees, Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717
(1986); and (2) functional uncertainty surrounding fee recovery, sometimes involving litigation
but always involving supplemental costs in fee documentation, see Selmi, supra note 83, at
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FLSA given its application to hourly wage workers. Further, among
those with high-value claims, fee-shifting is helpful only to those
who can obtain “prevailing party” status under Buckhannon Board
& Care Home Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human
Resources.228 The fee-shifting provision thus may enable only a small
number of employee regulators, given that claims are typically of
low value and given problems of strategic capitulation by defen-
dants. Regulation, therefore, may be incommensurate with the often
extensive reach of wrongdoing in the context of the FLSA.
Additional damages provisions, such as those for double or treble
damages, which might improve the economics of claiming, likely
would not sufficiently align regulation of the typically widespread
harm under the FLSA with the scope of that harm.229 The collective
action proceeding under the FLSA, the opt-in procedure that
was largely an historical  accident,230 can help overcome these
asymmetries in litigation stakes and align more closely the scope of
regulation with the scope of harm, but in many instances will fail on
both counts absent the presence of employee agents to facilitate the
opt-in process.231
The more typical opt-out class action under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 may be better designed to facilitate the economics of
claiming and to more closely align the scope of regulation and the
scope of wrongdoing, at least when employee agents are not in
place.232 At the very least, therefore, courts should reconsider their
1453-54. 
228. 532 U.S. at 600.
229. This is particularly true given that double damages are available under the FLSA only
for “willful” violations. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); 29 U.S.C. § 626(b); see also Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 125 (1985) (noting that section 7(b) of the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634),
qualified the remedy available under section 16(b) of the FLSA “by a provisio that a prevailing
plaintiff is entitled to double damages ‘only in the case of willful violations’”).
230. See Elizabeth K. Spahn, Resurrecting the Spurious Class: Opting-In to the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act and the Equal Pay Act Through the Fair Labor Standards
Act, 71 GEO. L.J. 119, 126-28 (1982) (discussing that the type of class action that would apply
under the 1938 version of Rule 23 was the “spurious” class action, which required plaintiffs
to opt in). 
231. See id. at 133 (explaining that the current version of the FLSA does not provide for
the “agency class action procedure”).
232. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. Employee agents may not be in place either because relevant
employees are not members of unions or other similar organizations, or because such agents
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overwhelmingly permissive stance toward class action waivers in
the context of the FLSA.233 The tendency under current doctrine
toward one-size-fits-all metrics that focus on class action’s norma-
tive desirability as a dispute resolution mechanism will not do. As
this Part reveals, such abstract efforts only obscure crucial inquiries
about whether and to what extent the class action mechanism is
necessary for the effectuation of particular regulatory goals through
private enforcement, given the substantive claims at issue and the
relative abilities of various parties to reliably serve as regulators. 
A final inquiry about informational advantages is required.
Informational advantages do not always inure to the party with
motivation or incentive to operationalize that information through
enforcement of the regulatory scheme. To the extent the infor-
mationally advantaged party is insufficiently able or motivated to
enforce regulatory objectives, enforcement mechanisms may well
need to be entrusted to alternative regulators. However, such
mechanisms should be carefully tailored to provide for either some
modicum of supervision by the informationally superior party or for
the curing of informational asymmetries. 
Consider, for example, the “Indirect Purchaser Rule” under fed-
eral antitrust law, under which only direct purchasers—and not
indirect purchasers—have standing to sue for federal antitrust
violations.234 Scholars have long debated the merits of the rule,
many lamenting that it prevents the “true victims” of antitrust
violations from suing.235 In fact, a number of states have enacted
statutes enabling indirect purchasers to sue.236 But as a matter of
identifying the person in the line of harm with the best information,
are not even in existence for a particular industry.
233. See, e.g., Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1371, 1378-79 (11th Cir.
2005); Walker v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 400 F.3d 370, 387 n.8 (6th Cir. 2005);
Carter v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 362 F.3d 294, 298 (5th Cir. 2004). 
234. See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 745-46 (1977).
235. Robert H. Lande, New Options for State Indirect Purchaser Legislation: Protecting the
Real Victims of Antitrust Violations, 61 ALA. L. REV. 447, 447-48 (2010); see also Andrew I.
Gavil, Thinking Outside the Illinois Brick Box: A Proposal for Reform, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 167,
170-71 (2009) (arguing that Illinois Brick should be overruled). 
236. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-60(a) (1975); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16750(a) (West
2008); D.C. CODE § 28-4509(a) (2011); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 10/7(2) (West 2010); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 445.778 (2009); MINN. STAT. § 325D.57 (2010); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-21-9
(1972); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-1-3(A) (1978); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-1-33 (2011); WIS. STAT.
§ 133.18(1)(a) (2011). 
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incentive, and ability to sue, the rule seems to make sense, as the
Court has recognized: direct purchasers have better information,
because they are integrated directly into a market for goods, giving
them first-hand awareness of wrongdoing, and moreover, because
they tend to have a larger stake.237 
However, the limitation on indirect purchaser suits is problem-
atic, even if direct purchasers are informationally advantaged, when
direct purchasers are unlikely or unable to sue. Those with the best
information about antitrust violations—arguably, direct purchas-
ers—may not be the parties with any motivation to sue, given that
direct purchasers often wish to avoid “disrupting relationships with
[limited] suppliers.”238 This is especially true if direct purchasers are
able to pass on any overcharges that result from antitrust violations
to consumers.239 Viewed through this Article’s conceptual frame-
work, the Supreme Court’s all-or-nothing “Indirect Purchaser Rule”
sweeps too broadly. 
The framework therefore calls for the design of carefully circum-
scribed mechanisms of enforcement to enable indirect purchasers
to fill a void in the regulation of antitrust conduct within certain
typically nationalized markets.240 Perhaps, for example, Congress
237. In contradistinction with indirect purchasers, who “have only a tiny stake in the
lawsuit and hence little incentive to sue,” and whose suits might be hampered by “attempts
to trace the effects of [an antitrust overcharge violation] on the purchaser’s prices, sales, costs,
and profits,” Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 725, 726 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations
omitted), direct purchasers need not litigate complicated cost-passing theories, given their
relationship of privity with suppliers, and thus are better positioned to ensure “vigorous
private enforcement of the antitrust laws.” Id. at 745-46.
238. Id. at 746; see also Kevin J. O'Connor, Is the Illinois Brick Wall Crumbling?, 15
ANTITRUST 34, 38 (2001) (noting that “indirect purchasers are perhaps more likely to bring
suit” because they do not risk severing a “direct business relationship with the alleged
violator”); Adam Thimmesch, Beyond Treble Damages: Hanover Shoe and Direct Purchaser
Suits After Comes v. Microsoft Corp., 90 IOWA L. REV. 1649, 1668 & n.127 (2005) (showing that
in many monopoly situations a direct purchaser is unwilling to sue because the purchaser is
dependent on the monopoly). 
239. Thimmesch, supra note 238, at 1656-57 (describing the process by which direct
purchasers pass on costs to indirect purchasers).
240. Existing state laws that permit indirect purchaser suits do not provide an adequate
response. Such statutes do not exist in all states; moreover, these statutes frequently do not
reach extraterritorial conduct and thus cannot enable regulation of violations in ever-
increasing nationalized product markets. Compare, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 416.131 (2010) (“No
action under [this act] shall be barred on the ground that the activity or conduct complained
of in any manner affects or involves interstate or foreign commerce.”), with, e.g., In re
Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 2003-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 74,138 (D. Md. 2003) (finding that
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could enact federal legislation allowing indirect purchaser suits, but
only in product markets with few suppliers. Alternatively, Congress
might permit indirect purchaser suits more broadly, but insert
provisions in the relevant legislation to address the risk of duplica-
tive liability if, in fact, direct purchasers bring suit for the same
conduct.241 
In addition, concerns that indirect purchasers generally possess
fractional stakes in any given suit and, moreover, do not benefit
from the efficiencies of scale that often inure to defendants who
have an incentive to invest optimally in the various phases of liti-
gation, may be surmountable only by additional mechanisms of
enforcement. Available mechanisms for overcoming such problems
are the class action and the qui tam regime.242 Regarding the latter,
a qui tam regime for indirect purchasers could trigger, in appropri-
ate circumstances, government investigation and prosecution of
antitrust violations.243 Such a mechanism is not available under
current law, but it could help indirect purchasers overcome barriers
to enforcement and might also better integrate public and private
enforcement of antitrust violations.244 Unless and until such a
mechanism comes into being, however, courts should skeptically
approach attempts to limit the availability of the class action device
in the area of antitrust, at least in the context of indirect purchaser
Mississippi antitrust act is limited to conduct “lying wholly within” Mississippi). These
statutes may also sweep too broadly: very few address the problem of duplicative recovery
that may arise in situations where both direct and indirect purchasers are motivated to bring
suit. But see infra note 243.
241. There is precedent for such a regime in some state laws permitting indirect purchaser
suits, see, e.g., 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/7 (“[When] claims are asserted against a defendant by
both direct and indirect purchasers, the court shall take all steps necessary to avoid duplicate
liability for the same injury.”), and in separate federal laws, such as the FLSA, see 29 U.S.C.
§ 216(c) (2006). 
242. Other mechanisms, not yet in existence in the United States, could theoretically be
adopted to address the problem of negative-value suits. As just one example, Australia has
begun experimenting with private third-party financing of litigation. See IMF, http://www.
imf.com.au (last visited Feb. 17, 2012) (“IMF is a public[ly] listed company providing funding
of legal claims.”). To the extent it is desirable for such a market to emerge in the United
States—a question for future work—that market could help facilitate the economics of
claiming.
243. See William E. Kovacic, Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures and Teaming
Arrangements Involving Government Contractors, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 1059, 1076-77 (1990)
(describing qui tam procedure and its potential applicability to private antitrust litigation).
244. See id.
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claims. Finally, given the difficulty indirect purchasers face in
proving injury causation—yet another concern expressed by the
Supreme Court in adopting the “Indirect Purchaser Rule”245—
mechanisms outside the law, in the form of sophisticated experts
who can detect and testify to the existence of things like price-fixing
conspiracies,246 must continue to develop if indirect purchasers are
to serve as regulators. 
B. Tailoring Private Enforcement Mechanisms to Remedial Gaps
and Remedial Overkill
A great number of regulatory regimes provide for remediation of
harms—in the forms of compensation and deterrence—by both
public and private regulatory efforts. Better integration of the
means for achieving regulatory goals in a diffuse enforcement
regime therefore requires increased attentiveness to the twin prob-
lems of remedial gaps and remedial overkill within any particular
scheme. All other things being equal, and again drawing on specific
examples, this Part posits that, in general, to the extent a public
regulatory body is limited in its ability to seek certain types of
remedies for a given form of wrongdoing, both underdeterrence and
undercompensation within a particular regulatory scheme may
result in the absence of private enforcement mechanisms to obtain
those remedies.247 Alternatively, remedial overkill can result within
the context of specific regulatory regimes when, for instance, two or
more mechanisms of private enforcement combine vis-à-vis the
enforcement of a particular substantive law to create excessive or
duplicative liability that is vastly disproportionate to the underlying
harm.248 Remedial overkill can also result when a particular mech-
anism of enforcement in a specific regulatory context too easily
permits private parties to extract settlement values either for mer-
itless claims or for conduct that the relevant legislature has not
even deemed wrongful.249
245. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746-47 (1977).
246. See Issacharoff & Samuel, supra note 12, at 60-61 (noting that complex harms require
nonlawyer experts to aid in enforcement).
247. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 346.
248. See infra notes 257-58 and accompanying text.
249. See infra text accompanying notes 256-57.
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Again, it helps to think not just conceptually but also concretely.
Regarding underremediation, consider the regulatory framework in
which the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) operates. The DOJ is hindered in its ability to obtain
remediation for RICO violations, particularly for mass fraud, given
its inability to seek disgorgement.250 The Supreme Court recognized
the problem, at least partially, in Bridge v. Phoenix Bond &
Indemnity Co.251 Rejecting explicitly the argument that RICO
carried with it a requirement of first-party reliance, the Court
pointed out that respondents “were the only parties injured by
petitioners’ misrepresentations,” and that “no more immediate
victim [was] better situated to sue.”252 Moreover, the Court observed
that there was no risk of duplicative recovery.253 The Court’s holding
reflects a concern that a key mechanism of RICO’s private enforce-
ment—an interpretation of the statute that allows plaintiffs to claim
third-party reliance—be preserved. Lower courts, however, have
interpreted and applied Bridge in a way that effectively requires
proof of direct reliance, thereby cutting off ex post regulation
—sometimes the only form of regulation likely to occur for a given
RICO violation.254 This is an undesirable result in light of the
overall regulatory scheme. 
This one mechanism—allowing indirect proof of reliance—may be
sufficient to enable private enforcement across much of the RICO
landscape. Indeed, for larger RICO fraud claims, additional mech-
anisms that facilitate the economics of enforcement, such as the
class action, may not be necessary to encourage suits. This is
particularly true given the tendency of high-value RICO cases, even
those involving allegations of the same conduct, to settle on an
aggregate basis either informally or through MDL.255 In such situ-
250. See Leah Bressack, Note, Small Claim Mass Fraud Actions: A Proposal for Aggregate
Litigation Under RICO, 61 VAND. L. REV. 579, 580-81 (2008).
251. 553 U.S. 639, 657-58 (2008).
252. Id. at 658.
253. Id.
254. See, e.g., UFCW Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly & Co., 620 F.3d 121, 134 (2d Cir. 2010) (cutting
off ex post regulation of drug manufacturers’ alleged RICO fraud by third-party payors, likely
the only parties in position to bring suit). 
255. See infra text accompanying notes 375-77 (providing further discussion of MDL).
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ations, the class action device is not needed to align the scope of
regulation with the scope of the harm. 
For small-value RICO claims, however, mechanisms like the class
action device are critical to facilitate private enforcement. And more
importantly, the class action device is likely able to function in the
context of RICO fraud claims if parties can allege causation or
reliance by means of statistical or aggregate proof.256 The types of
proof that parties must show is highly variant among cases, and the
complexities of articulating statistical models are not the work of
this Article. But at the very least, the types of aggregate proof that
are permitted must be carefully policed: broad leeway for statistical
proof may, in combination with liberal pleading—which is discussed
in more detail below257—give plaintiffs the ability to file meritless
or highly speculative complaints and leverage hydraulic settlement
pressure. 
Enforcement mechanisms must also be carefully tailored to
preserve meaningful enforcement while at the same time avoiding
significant remedial overkill. First, some enforcement mechanisms,
in combination, may result in vast overremediation. Take, for
example, the combination of the class action mechanism and stat-
utory damages. Both exist to overcome the problem of small-value
claims, but the combination of the two may go too far. Statutory
damages, in particular, often exist to compensate for the fact that
only a small percentage of those affected by various harms will
initiate suit to penalize the wrongdoer, and thus the wrongdoer
would pay only a small percentage of the total actual damages that
exist. The class action separately overcomes the “small percentage
of claimants” problem, effectively bringing all plaintiffs to the table
through class certification. Deploying both enforcement mechanisms
simultaneously may bring about crushing liability wildly dispropor-
tionate to the total actual damages. 
The Court recently discounted this very problem in Shady Grove
Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co.258 Shady Grove in-
volved a potential conflict between Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23, which authorizes federal courts to certify a class action provided
256. See generally Bressack, supra note 250.
257. See infra Part III.B.
258. 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).
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that certain conditions are met,259 and a provision of New York law
that prohibits plaintiffs seeking statutory damages from joining
together as a class.260 If New York’s law had been allowed to govern
the case, class litigation would be disallowed in federal court, just
as it was in state court. Both the district court and the Second
Circuit concluded that New York’s law governed and, further, that
Rule 23 did not displace the state law.261 The Supreme Court re-
versed. Writing for a sharply divided Court,262 Justice Scalia con-
cluded that the New York law and Rule 23 were indeed in conflict,
that Rule 23 trumped state law, and that plaintiffs could therefore
bring a class action for statutory damages in federal court even
though they would not have been permitted to do so in state court.263
Looking to the Court’s jurisprudence under the Rules Enabling
Act,264 and more specifically to Hanna v. Plumer,265 Justice Scalia
found it “obvious that rules allowing multiple claims (and claims by
or against multiple parties) to be litigated together” are valid under
the Rules Enabling Act.266 He noted—somewhat paradoxically267
—that the class action is nothing more than a mere joinder device
that “alter[s] only how [plaintiffs’] claims are processed.”268 Justice
259. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)-(c).
260. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) (MCKINNEY 2006) (“Unless a statute ... specifically authorizes
the recovery [of statutory damages or penalties] in a class action, an action to recover a
penalty [or statutory damages] ... may not be maintained as a class action.”). 
261. The district court and the Second Circuit decisions were in line with nearly all other
district courts and their decisions. See Burbank & Wolff, supra note 108, at 23 & n.27 (citing
cases).
262. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. 1431 (Majority Opinion Parts I, II-A: Scalia, J., joined by
Roberts, C.J., Thomas, J., Sotomayor, J., and Stevens, J.; Plurality Opinion Parts II-B, II-C,
II-D: Scalia, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., Thomas, J., and Sotomayor, J. (Parts II-B, II-D only);
Concurring: Stevens, J.; Dissenting: Ginsburg, J., joined by Kennedy, J., Breyer, J., and Alito,
J.). 
263. Id. at 1438-39 (majority opinion).
264. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006).
265. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
266. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1443 (Scalia, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., Thomas, J.,
and Sotomayor, J.).
267. In so concluding, Justice Scalia ignored the significant and unique impact that the
class action has on the economics of claiming, on settlement (in the form of hydraulic pressure
to settle), on deterrence of widespread wrongs, and on the administration of litigation
itself—ironically, features that the Court, in the same term, found so fundamentally altered
the litigation process that parties must explicitly contract for the class action device in
arbitration. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1783 (2010). 
268. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1443 (Scalia, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., Thomas, J., and
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Scalia was unpersuaded by the concern underlying the New York
legislature’s decision to enact section 901(b), namely that the
availability of class-wide relief would result in remedial overkill269
—or, as one New York commentator put the point, “annihilating
punishment.”270 The concern is by no means insignificant: by at-
tempting to obtain certification, class counsel sought to “transform
a $500 [individual] case into a $5,000,000 award.”271 Nonetheless,
the plurality dismissed this concern regarding the distortion of a
given statute’s remedial scheme as merely an “incidental effect” of
the class action.272 
By paying scant heed to the problem of remedial overkill that the
New York legislature sought to prevent, the result in Shady Grove
reveals the failure of contemporary legal doctrine to take systematic
account of the proper structural role of private enforcement mech-
anisms in our diffuse regulatory system and, in particular, of the
ways in which private enforcement mechanisms must be carefully
tailored to ensure that they advance rather than impair regulatory
objectives. The plurality in Shady Grove refused to take into account
the New York legislature’s concern, in part because it was not
obvious from the statute’s text but, more fundamentally, because
the doctrinal framework of Hanna v. Plumer has left little room for
considerations of remedial overkill.273 Shady Grove thus illustrates
the need for more nuanced analysis—which may require doctrinal
change under Erie—of the potential for these mechanisms to work
Sotomayor, J.). 
269. See id. at 1443-44.
270. N.Y. C.P.L.R. cmt. 901:11 (MCKINNEY 2005) (quoting Ratner v. Chem. Bank of N.Y.,
54 F.R.D. 412, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)). 
271. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
272. See id. at 1444 (Scalia, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., Thomas, J., and Sotomayor, J.). 
273. See id. at 1440 (majority opinion). In particular, the Court held that, under Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), Rule 23 and section 901(b) of New York’s Civil Practice Law and
Rules conflicted, and that, because Rule 23 is “rationally capable of classification” as
“governing practice” within the meaning of the Rules Enabling Act, Rule 23 displaced section
901(b) in federal court.  Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472-74. For a more thorough discussion of the
Court’s analysis in Shady Grove, see Richard A. Nagareda, The Litigation-Arbitration
Dichotomy Meets the Class Action,  86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1069, 1075 (2011) (“[S]ince Hanna,
if the Federal Rule [of procedure] truly conflicts with state law, then the real-world effects of
that Rule upon claiming are deemed merely incidental and, hence, short of the Rules Enabling
Act stricture against the alteration of substantive rights.”); see also Burbank & Wolff, supra
note 108.
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regulatory distortions within the context of the given substantive
scheme.274 
Another potential form of remedial overkill is what may be
properly termed “regulatory expansion,” whereby private parties’
enforcement enables them to expand the law to include prohibitions
that the legislature never enacted. As with the availability of stat-
utory damages in class actions, the Court has not crisply identified
the problem of regulatory expansion, nor has it framed such ex-
pansion as implicating either the remedial effects of enforcement
mechanisms or the ways in which such effects reveal the need for
the modification or addition of mechanisms to mitigate overrem-
ediation. The landmark decision in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly pro-
vides a perfect vehicle for evaluating these issues.275 As discussed
above, the decision in Twombly is most famous for imposing a new
“plausibility” test in standards for notice pleading that scholars and
jurists had perceived as settled for decades.276 Situated within this
Article’s conceptual framework, Twombly represents a recognition
of the danger of regulatory expansion in the context of antitrust law.
It also highlights the need—unrecognized by the Court—for careful
consideration both of whether private enforcement mechanisms are
necessary to enable conspiracy claims under antitrust laws and
whether additional mechanisms, perhaps not yet in use or existence,
274. The Court’s decision in Shady Grove also generates an odd regulatory mismatch vis-à-
vis state and federal legislatures’ crafting of remedial schemes. This oddity became apparent
immediately following the Court’s decision, when on grant, vacate, and remand (GVR), the
Second Circuit in Holster v. Gatco, Inc., 618 F.3d 214 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
2151 (2011), reaffirmed its prior holding that section 901(b) prohibited a defendant from
removing to federal court under CAFA a putative class action arising under the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), which provided for statutory damages. Id. at 215-16.
Because the TCPA states that suits under the Act may proceed “if otherwise permitted by the
laws or rules of [the] court of a State,” the court held that claims under the Act were limited
by section 901(b). See id. at 216 (citing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. §
227(b)(3)). The combination of Shady Grove and Holster creates a strange regulatory
mismatch: Although a state legislature is constrained in its ability to calibrate the
enforcement levels of its own laws—at least through broad pronouncements via enactments
such as section 901(b)—Congress may give life to those same enactments. In other words,
state prerogatives concerning the contours of remedial schemes embodied in state law are
subject to significant reworking simply by the filing of suit in federal court, but state
prerogatives may nonetheless control the contours of remedial schemes embodied in federal
law, if Congress so provides. 
275. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
276. See supra text accompanying notes 160-63.
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could mitigate the regulatory expansion that such enabling mech-
anisms might create.
In Twombly, consumers brought suit against the major incumbent
local telephone companies (ILECs), alleging that they had engaged
in an antitrust conspiracy in violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act.277 In particular, the plaintiffs alleged that the ILECs had
agreed not to enter each other’s territorial markets and to fight
against the entry of additional competitors into the market.278 The
plaintiffs’ complaint paired factual allegations of parallel conduct
with a conclusory allegation that such conduct gave rise to an
inference of unlawful conspiracy.279 The Court held the complaint
insufficient under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2).280 In light
of the history of telecommunications regulation, including the fact
that the defendants had previously been granted monopolies in their
territories,281 the Court held that the plaintiffs had failed to meet
the “plausibility” test because it was at least equally plausible (and
maybe more so) that the parallel conduct was driven by independ-
ent market considerations rather than by illicit anticompetitive
motives.282
Scholars have debated whether Twombly is defensible on the
Court’s reasoning.283 But the framework set forth in this Article
offers a different perspective. A fundamental problem with allowing
the particular suit in Twombly to go forward is that it would likely
have led to regulatory expansion. Parallel conduct in a market
economy is perfectly lawful; indeed, it is encouraged.284 Such conduct
277. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 549-50 (describing the “local telephone business” as “a
system of regional service monopolies” or “Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (ILECs)”).
278. See id. at 551.
279. See id. (citing Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint ¶ 51, Twombly v. Bell
Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (No. 02 CIV. 10200)). The Court discounted the plaintiffs’
conspiracy allegation as too conclusory to be credited. See id. at 556-57.
280. See id. at 557.
281. Id. at 549 (“The upshot of the 1984 divestiture of the American Telephone and
Telegraph Company’s (AT&T) local telephone business was a system of regional service
monopolies (variously called ... ‘Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (ILECs)’).” However,
“[m]ore than a decade later, Congress withdrew approval of the ILECs’ monopolies by
enacting the Telecommunications Act of 1996.”).
282. See id. at 566-68.
283. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 164, at 62.
284. See id. at 67 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554).
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may indicate that the market is functioning well.285 Discovery in
antitrust conspiracy cases is extremely costly,286 and under the
American rule of litigation—whereby each party bears his own
litigation costs—virtually all of the costs in these cases will be borne
by defendants, who likely have little to request in the way of
discovery from plaintiffs.287 As a result, discovery alone can generate
significant settlement pressure even if the defendants did nothing
wrong and are likely to be ultimately exonerated.288 The combina-
tion of these factors made the plaintiffs’ allegations of parallel con-
duct, accompanied by a conclusory assertion of conspiracy, problem-
atic from the standpoint of substantive regulatory objectives. If
private parties are permitted through artful pleading to make every
instance of parallel conduct the basis for a lawsuit, and if those
lawsuits generate economic pressure leading to settlements based
on that pressure in a significant number of cases, private parties
will have, through creative pleading, written prohibitions into sub-
stantive law that Congress never imposed nor wanted to impose.289
That said, the potential for regulatory expansion does not neces-
sarily warrant a response that all but eliminates private parties’
regulation of antitrust conspiracies. Putting aside a number of other
objections one might level against the holding in Twombly, it is the
proverbial bazooka to the regulatory distortion’s ant when viewed
on context of a system of diffuse regulation of antitrust violations.
Even if a liberal pleading regime leads to too much—or the wrong
kind of—private regulation, antitrust law likely needs some mod-
icum of private ex post regulation of conspiracy for more complete
remediation of such wrongdoing. The DOJ relies heavily on anti-
trust wrongdoers to come forward under its Amnesty Program for
the remediation of conspiracy-related harm,290 but the DOJ also
relies on private enforcement to detect instances of wrongdoing
285. See id. at 67-68.
286. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558.
287. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975).
288. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559.
289. Id. at 553.
290. James M. Griffin, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
A Summary Overview of the Antitrust Division’s Criminal Enforcement Program, Speech
Before the ABA Section of Antitrust Law Annual Meeting 7-8 (Aug. 12, 2003), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/201477.htm.
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when parties are not so forthcoming.291 Twombly thus reveals that
the procedural mechanisms of enforcement currently in place are
insufficient to render private parties capable regulators of antitrust
conspiracies without simultaneously creating unwanted regulatory
distortion. 
Specifically, although both the majority and the dissent in
Twombly lamented the high costs of discovery in antitrust conspir-
acy cases,292 the resulting remedial overkill would be better ad-
dressed by more nuanced procedural mechanisms of enforcement.
For instance, perhaps the Civil Rules Advisory Committee could
construct a permissive pleading standard for antitrust conspiracy
and couple that standard with a modified discovery regime, whereby
plaintiffs are allowed circumscribed discovery for a limited period of
time, after which point their allegations must extend beyond
evidence of parallel conduct. This approach would leave in place the
enforcement mechanism of Rule 8 and address its potential to create
regulatory distortions.293 Such a regime is not without precedent;
circumscribed discovery is often allowed prior to class certifica-
tion.294 Whatever the right mechanisms are, they must ensure ex
post enforcement but mitigate the ability of parties to generate
remedial overkill. Such mechanisms are needed across broad swaths
of the legal landscape in which the relative ease of alleging wrong-
doing, combined with the difficulty of proving such wrongs, has the
potential to lead to regulatory expansion.
And of course, none of these suggestions precludes better com-
munication among private parties, courts, legislatures, and public
agencies regarding enforcement prerogatives. If anything, and to the
extent coordination mechanisms could be designed to function
efficiently, the foregoing analysis reveals the need for such mecha-
nisms. For example, Shady Grove provides an example of the poten-
tial need for more formalized channels of communication between
the Court and the state legislature vis-à-vis enforcement preroga-
291. See, e.g., Kent Roach & Michael J. Trebilcock, Private Enforcement of Competition
Laws, 34 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 461, 472, 478-80 (1996) (pointing out that many violations of
antitrust statues are exceedingly difficult for the government to detect). 
292. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558 (majority opinion); id. at 573 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
293. See Glover, supra note 166, at 44-51.
294. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (governing discovery).
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tives.295 Moving forward, with or without better communication,
much of the legal landscape needs private enforcement mechanisms
that are carefully tailored to the enforcement needs of a particular
regulatory scheme and sensitive to their potential, alone or in com-
bination with other private mechanisms or public enforcement
efforts, to generate remedial overkill. 
C. Preserving Private Claims When Needed to Address Harm that
Tends Not to Be Prevented by Ex Ante Regulation 
Although various regimes within the American legal system rely
on private, ex post enforcement for the achievement of regulatory
objectives, many industries are regulated by extensive public
regimes. For instance, within areas of law largely reliant on ex ante
regulation, the need for private mechanisms of enforcement is less
pronounced. In such situations, when a public regulatory scheme
comprehensively addresses particular forms of wrongdoing, state
law claims may well be distortive of overall regulatory goals.
Indeed, such mechanisms can generate such distortions when, for
example, a regulatory regime is characterized by a need for uni-
formity of obligations across a nationalized industry, or state law
claims in a particular regulatory context tend systematically to
generate negative spillover effects against out-of-state defendants.296
Consequently, statements of preemption or the judicial analysis of
preemption issues should take into account the potential generation
of these pathologies. 
However, these pathologies should not prove talismanic in the
preemption analysis. Rather, preemption doctrines should take
these concerns into account along with express consideration of the
extent to which those claims provide, in a particular regulatory
295. See supra notes 258-74 and accompanying text. One scholar, for instance, has
suggested that courts certify difficult questions of statutory interpretation to Congress. See
Amanda Frost, Certifying Questions to Congress, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2007). A similar idea
could be deployed here, although, at least under the circumstances of Shady Grove, the Court
was presented with ample evidence that the New York legislature wished to prevent the
combining of these two mechanisms of enforcement in a single suit—evidence, as the dissent
points out, that the Court should not have ignored. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1464-65 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
296. See supra Part II.E.
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scheme, ex post stopgap remedial measures to address situations
involving significant levels of harm that simply could not be, nor
were, foreseen ex ante. Particularly if the matter at issue is one of
traditional state regulation through common law,297 preservation or
creation of such mechanisms to provide comprehensive regulation
may be warranted.
One of the most prominent examples of a regulatory regime
characterized by robust ex ante public enforcement is the FDA-
administered preapproval and supervisory system for drugs and
other biologics.298 Under this regime, unconstrained ex post regu-
lation by private parties would result in overregulation and dis-
courage innovation of new products.299 As such, preemption of state
law tort claims in areas governed by robust ex ante regulatory
enforcement may be desirable. That said, preemption can sweep
with too broad a brush. To begin, private, ex post regulation may be
needed to fill gaps left by the ex ante regime. Further, such regu-
lation may provide a necessary complement to ex ante regimes to
the extent the public regulatory bodies are unable to anticipate all
forms of harm or the countless ways in which regulated entities may
try to evade compliance. 
Regarding the former, the Court recently rejected arguments that
private enforcement should fill such ex ante regulatory gaps in the
context of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act (Vaccine
Act).300 Specifically, as highlighted in the recent arguments in
Bruesewitz v. Wyeth,301 the FDA does not regulate vaccines, drugs,
and medical devices ex ante to ensure that such products reflect
the safest possible design in light of current scientific knowledge.302
297. See generally United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1994).
298. See supra text accompanying notes 20-21.
299. See, e.g., Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 350 (2001) (expressing
concern that permitting state law tort claims against the manufacturers of medical devices
would discourage manufacturers from seeking FDA approval in the first place).
300. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to -34 (2006); Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1078-80
(2011).
301. 131 S. Ct. at 1079.
302. For example, to demonstrate a vaccine’s safety under FDA regulations, the vaccine’s
sponsor need not show that it adopted the safest feasible design. Id. In this way, the FDA is
a passive agency because it considers only the designs that manufacturers put before it. See,
e.g., Jones by Jones v. Lederle Labs., 695 F. Supp. 700, 711 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (“[T]he agency
takes the drugs and manufacturers as it finds them.... [I]t is limited to reviewing only those
drugs submitted by various manufacturers, regardless of their flaws.”).
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The FDA’s ex ante review of such products simply requires
manufacturers to provide a “reasonable assurance” of safety303—
often based on small clinical trials. Once they are on the market,
the FDA’s surveillance of these products is far more modest.304
Consequently, as scientific knowledge and technology have pro-
gressed, a number of products have remained on the market long
after they became outdated and, crucially, less safe than available
alternatives.305 The FDA’s ex ante approval process is then arguably
ill equipped to deal comprehensively with all of the potential
dangers that these outdated products may pose.306
The majority in Bruesewitz gave short shrift to these arguments
and held that the Act preempted state law design defect claims.307
The majority did note, however, that because the Vaccine Act con-
tains a stopgap remedial scheme of ex post enforcement designed to
address at least some of the weaknesses of ex ante regulations, the
enacting Congress could not have intended private regulation.308
Specifically, the Vaccine Act sets up a fund, maintained through an
excise tax on vaccine manufacturers, to compensate the families of
children who later develop diseases likely attributable to particular
vaccines.309 However, as the dissent recognized, the compensation
regime in the Vaccine Act is not optimally designed as a matter of
deterrence—it is not actually funded by the manufacturers at all.
The costs of the excise tax that the Act levies against all vaccines
are passed on to the patients.310 And in the absence of informal
competitive market pressures to update products in light of scien-
303. 21 C.F.R. § 860.7 (2011).
304. See supra note 176.
305. See Vladeck, supra note 176, at 127-29.
306. See id. at 129.
307. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1083 (2011).
308. See id. at 1080. Congress also provided such a scheme in the Price-Anderson Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2) (2006), which federalizes personal injury and property damage claims
arising from significant accidents at nuclear power plants. 
309. The Vaccine Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to -34, created the National Vaccine Injury
Compensation Program, which compensates people injured by covered vaccines from money
held in the Vaccine Injury Compensation Trust Fund. 26 U.S.C. § 9510; see also National
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (VICP), HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVICES ADMIN.,
http://www.hrsa.gov/vaccinecompensation (last visited Nov. 7, 2011). Covered vaccines are
listed in 26 U.S.C. § 4132. Money for the fund comes from an excise tax on vaccines. 26 U.S.C.
§ 4131. 
310. Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. at 1086, 1099 n.22 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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tific advances, which are nonexistent in the context of the vaccine
market because that market has only one or two manufacturers per
vaccine,311 these regulatory gaps remain. Thus, in the vaccine con-
text, no regulation places a duty nor does any regulatory scheme
impose economic pressure on manufacturers to keep up with scien-
tific advances.312 
That said, viewed in this Article’s framework, the Bruesewitz
Court may well have reached the correct result, at least in light of
the comparative comprehensiveness of the public regulatory scheme
for vaccines versus other biologics. The regulatory gaps discussed
above are in fact far more pronounced outside the context of the
regulatory framework for vaccines.313 Indeed, despite its imper-
fections, the framework for vaccines is more comprehensive than
those for any other product regulated by the FDA: there is ex ante
approval on the front end, a modicum of supervision in the interim,
and a stopgap compensation regime on the back end.314 In other
words, the Vaccine Act represents an exception within the FDA ex
ante regulatory regime.315
In theory, administrative agencies could impose additional ex
ante regulations to fill the remaining regulatory gaps. There is
certainly room for greater rigor in the ex ante approval process for
pharmaceuticals, which is far from comprehensive. For instance, the
data submitted at the premarket stage is provided entirely by the
manufacturer,316 is often based on a single clinical trial,317 and is
311. Id. at 1098.
312. Id. at 1097.
313. See TASK FORCE ON RISK MGMT., FDA, MANAGING THE RISKS FROM MEDICAL PRODUCT
USE: CREATING A RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK 30 (1999), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
safety/safetyofspecificproducts/ucm180520.pdf (“The majority of FDA program resources are
devoted to premarketing scientific risk identification and assessment and approval or
nonapproval. Significant, but substantially fewer, resources are devoted to postmarketing
surveillance and risk assessment activities.”).
314. See supra notes 298-312 and accompanying text.
315. See Stensvad, supra note 175, at 322-23 (describing the unique circumstances leading
to the enactment of the Vaccine Act).
316. See Stuart R. Cohn & Erin M. Swick, The Sitting Ducks of Securities Class Action
Litigation: Bio-Pharmas and the Need for Improved Evaluation of Scientific Data, 35 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 911, 916-19 (2010) (describing approval data as provided exclusively by manu-
facturers); see also supra note 176.
317. See Cohn & Swick, supra note 316, at 918 (describing how high-priority medications
may be expedited through the clinical trial review phase of the approval process).
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often otherwise unreliable.318 Postmarket supervision of these pro-
ducts is relatively minimal—there is no requirement that manufac-
turers update their products in light of scientific advances nor is
there any requirement of periodic recertification.319 
It is far from clear, however, that increased approval require-
ments or more rigorous postapproval supervision would sufficiently
address the remaining regulatory gaps in the FDA’s regulation of
pharmaceuticals and biologics, because it is implausible to ask
regulatory bodies to craft ex ante measures that anticipate all
future harm or to close every potential compliance loophole, at least
without drastically overregulating on the front end so as to foreclose
or discourage market entry in the first place.320 Consider, for in-
stance, the harms that resulted from the use of Vioxx,321 which
would have gone completely unaddressed under the current regu-
latory scheme absent the filing of state law tort claims by individu-
als who suffered harm.322 It is far from clear, as the FDA admitted,
that additional ex ante regulations—which would likely discourage
innovation and market entry to an intolerable degree—would have
been sufficient to prevent the Vioxx debacle.323
State-law tort claims, then, can play an important role in ad-
dressing harms ex post to the extent they are not prevented or
covered by ex ante regulations, and particularly when the matter at
issue is one that states traditionally regulate through the common
318. See, e.g., Vladeck, supra note 176, at 126-30. 
319. See id. at 127-28. 
320. See, e.g. Gerald A. Faich, Adverse Drug Experience Reporting and Product Liability,
41 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 444, 444 (1986) (“[P]reapproval clinical trials and other testing
cannot tell us everything we would like to know about a drug.... [W]e usually have little
human information about rare events, late latent effects, drug interactions, or effects in
specialized populations.”).
321. See, e.g., Gina Kolata, A Widely Used Arthritis Drug Is Withdrawn, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
1, 2004, at A1.
322. See David Henderson & Charles Hooper, Clear Thinking About Vioxx, REASON (Jan.
3, 2005), http://www.reason.com/archives/2005/01/03/Clear-thinking-about-vioxx (suggesting
that it was the threat of litigation that led Merck to withdraw Vioxx, not the threat of
government action).
323. FDA, Merck and Vioxx: Putting Patient Safety First?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Fin., 108th Cong. 1 (2004) (statement of Sandra Kweder, M.D., Deputy Director, Office of New
Drugs, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, FDA) (“[A]ll approved drugs pose some level
of risk.... [W]e cannot anticipate all possible effects of a drug during the clinical trials that
precede approval.”).
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law.324 But such claims are often preempted under doctrines that
pay little heed to the relationship between private tort claims and
gaps in the regulatory scheme.325 What this framework calls for is
a more nuanced approach that makes the need for private enforce-
ment mechanisms, in light of the comprehensiveness of a specific
regulatory scheme, an express doctrinal consideration. Specifically,
for instance, preemption in the context of biologics may be tolerable,
if not desirable, when an overall regulatory scheme is fairly com-
prehensive, particularly given the national interest in uniform drug
standards,326 the potential for state tort suits to impose negative
spillover effects on out-of-state manufacturers,327 and the societal
need for innovative medical treatment. But in the absence of ex post
statutory compensation regimes—which would likely be preferable
to private enforcement efforts, all other things being equal, given
the FDA’s informational advantages about drug design—courts
should nonetheless cautiously approach the wholesale elimination
of ex post enforcement via expansive applications of preemption
doctrines. Whether such mechanisms of private enforcement are
needed—that is, whether preemption should be scaled back—de-
pends on careful examination of the needs of a particular regulatory
scheme. 
D. Providing Private Enforcement Mechanisms in the Face of
Public Regulatory Failure
As a practical matter, certain regulatory regimes—even those for
which a public regulatory body possesses informational advantages
324. See James M. Beck, Federal Preemption in FDA-Regulated Product-Liability
Litigation: Where We Are and Where We Might Be Headed, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 657, 694-96
(2009).
325. See, e.g., Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 312 (2008) (holding as preempted
state tort claims regarding the safety of catheters); Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm.,
531 U.S. 341, 341 (2001) (holding as preempted claims against a consultant to a spinal screw
manufacturer for making misrepresentations to the FDA); Colaccio v. Apotex, Inc., 521 F.3d
253, 253 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding failure to warn claims regarding the side effect of suicide for
antidepressants preempted); Sykes v. Glaxo-SmithKline, 484 F. Supp. 2d 289, 318 (E.D. Pa.
2007) (concluding that the FDCA preempted failure-to-warn claims).
326. See, e.g., Harley v. Lederie Lab., 651 F. Supp. 993, 1004 (E.D. Tex. 1986), rev’d on
other grounds, 851 F.2d 1536 (5th Cir. 1988).
327. See, e.g., Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 170, at 1386-88. 
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relative to private parties, and even those for which the public
regulatory scheme theoretically provides for complete remediation
and comprehensive regulation of wrongdoing—are characterized by
historical levels of significant underenforcement, thus necessitating
private enforcement mechanisms to achieve regulatory goals. A
point of clarification is in order: public regulatory bodies can always
be criticized for not doing “enough,” and it is not this Article’s goal
to nitpick agency enforcement decisions. Nor is it this Article’s
contention that something approaching maximum enforcement is
required of public agencies—simple dissatisfaction along these lines
is not an adequate basis for demanding increased private enforce-
ment mechanisms. 
That said, there are certain public regulatory bodies for which
empirical evidence reveals trends, over a number of years, of en-
forcement to such a minimal degree as to constitute a difference in
kind.328 Significant levels of underenforcement may be the result of
a host of factors, such as the systematic underfunding of the rele-
vant agency—which is not a reliable predictor of congressional
intent vis-à-vis enforcement prerogatives329—or pervasive capture
by regulated entities.330 It may well be that as a matter of optimal
design—in the presence of, say, informational advantages inuring
to the public regulatory body—these regulatory failures call for the
enabling of increased and better enforcement by those public
regulatory bodies, and to the extent such levels of underenforcement
have not persisted over a number of years, regulatory reforms are
best directed toward improving the public enforcement apparatus.
However, in the presence of historical trends of significant
underenforcement, the potentially “perfect” allocation of enforce-
ment mechanisms to public regulatory bodies cannot, and should
not, be the enemy of the “good”—namely, the entrusting of enforce-
ment mechanisms to private parties in order to achieve some
meaningful modicum of regulation under the governing substantive
328. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 41.
329. Underfunding of agencies is not necessarily a deliberate congressional choice but
rather may be the result of a number of potential factors, including simple scarcity, and the
disproportionate influence of congressional minorities—in particular, appropriations and
oversight committees—on enforcement appropriations. See Stephenson, supra note 90, at 107
n.40. 
330. See supra text accompanying note 61.
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law. Therefore, in evaluating the need for and appropriateness of
various private enforcement mechanisms within a given regulatory
scheme, courts, legislatures, and, when appropriate, administrative
agencies, should not just look at an aspirational version of the
enforcement scheme but rather should explicitly take into account
the extent to which a certain regulatory regime is in fact character-
ized by significant historical levels of regulatory inadequacy. In so
doing, these entities should appropriately calibrate private enforce-
ment mechanisms to enable private litigants to bring about regu-
lation of harm left largely unaddressed by the public regulatory
body.
For instance, recall that the EEOC is historically underfunded
and has achieved significantly low levels of enforcement.331 As one
scholar put the point, “[w]hatever the EEOC’s original mission, and
whatever the original hope, today the agency is clearly a failure,
serving in some instances as little more than an administrative
obstacle to resolution of claims on the merits.”332 As a consequence,
even though Title VII provides the EEOC with significant regula-
tory authority, the practical reality is that, for enforcement of Title
VII to occur on any meaningful level, private enforcement, and more
specifically, private enforcement mechanisms tailored to the specific
needs of potential employee regulators, must be in place. 
The Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD)
enforcement of the FHA provides another example of this practical
problem. Although HUD has superior access to information relevant
to housing discrimination,333 and although the 1988 amendments to
the FHA gave HUD broader authority to police housing discrimi-
nation,334 its enforcement levels have been substantially meager
as a historical matter. Specifically, HUD documents roughly six
merits-based determinations of housing discrimination per state
per year;335 the private bar is responsible for almost 84 percent of
331. See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
332. Michael Selmi, The Value of the EEOC: Reexamining the Agency’s Role in Employment
Discrimination Law, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 64 (1996). 
333. See supra Part III.A.
334. Fair Housing Amendments Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3610(e) (2006) (permitting HUD to pursue
claims of discrimination in federal court). 
335. See Selmi, supra note 83, at 1413.
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housing discrimination cases filed annually.336 And of the few cases
HUD does bring, nearly a third involve plaintiffs who had already
secured an attorney.337 Accordingly, HUD’s enforcement is, at best,
unhelpful vis-à-vis those plaintiffs who may most need their help
and is wasteful and duplicative at worst. Moreover, HUD tends
systematically to avoid pursuing large claims or claims that involve
more than a single potential plaintiff.338 
Therefore, even though HUD is better situated informationally
than private parties for purposes of enforcing the FHA, as a prac-
tical matter, private enforcement mechanisms are needed to enable
private party claiming and to help cure existing informational dis-
advantages. Accordingly, perhaps more strict disclosure require-
ments regarding housing demographics should be imposed on
apartment buildings, condominium complexes, and neighborhoods,
with such disclosures made available to the public. Alternatively, at
the very least, the heightened pleading standard under Twombly
and Iqbal ought to be accompanied, at least for FHA claims, with a
provision for some modicum of pleading-stage discovery, such that
potential plaintiffs can access aggregate, comparative information
about housing statistics—likely uniquely in the hands of potential
defendants—for evaluation of whether discrimination claims are
meritorious.339
As a final example, consider again the regulatory failures that
characterize the landscape of consumer safety. At the federal level,
recall that public regulation in the area of product safety is sig-
nificantly hindered by limited resources, limited authority, and
capture,340 as the federal government itself has recognized.341
Regulatory bodies at the state and local level are also constrained
in their ability to police wrongdoing, particularly wrongdoing that
336. Id. at 1418. 
337. Id. at 1439. 
338. Id. 
339. See generally Glover, supra note 166, at 39-42 (arguing that tailored discovery at the
pleading stage of litigation is likely needed for those subsets of claims characterized by
informational asymmetries between plaintiffs and defendants). 
340. See supra notes 57-67 and accompanying text.
341. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-803, CONSUMER SAFETY: BETTER
INFORMATION AND PLANNING WOULD STRENGTHEN CPSC’S OVERSIGHT OF IMPORTED PRODUCTS
13 (2009) (“[I]mplementation is limited by competing priorities and resource and practical
constraints.”). 
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is national or even global in scope.342 For instance, state attorneys
general are limited, both as a matter of resources and jurisdictional
reach, vis-à-vis interstate wrongdoing,343 as are other state reg-
ulatory bodies. Even states with very active Consumer Affairs
Departments, are hindered in their efforts by increasingly scarce
resources and jurisdictional limitations. This is not to say that
public enforcement should be discouraged—just the opposite, par-
ticularly given that public regulatory bodies are uniquely situated
to take into account broader considerations regarding the public
interest in the area of consumer harm.344 Rather, the point is that
regulation of consumer welfare by public bodies is insufficiently ro-
bust to reach a great number of consumer transactions. Accordingly,
unless and until public regulatory efforts change drastically, private
enforcement mechanisms tailored to the particular needs of po-
tential consumer-regulators are critical to ensure the regulation of
consumer harm.
Again, though, private regulation is only as good as the mech-
anisms that enable it. The last example about consumer safety,
broadened for illustrative purposes to encompass consumer welfare
more generally, enables exploration of issues of mechanism design
in light of public regulatory failure. Consumer transactions in-
creasingly occur on a national or even global scale; this, along with
the generally hidden nature of misconduct in the consumer context,
reduces the effectiveness of ordinary market mechanisms, such as
reputational constraints, in the absence of private market agents to
prevent wrongdoing.345 Moreover, expansive markets enable sellers
to engage in “democratized theft,” whereby a single actor engages in
various forms of wrongdoing—such as misrepresentation, charging
usurious rates, and producing defective products—that result in
substantial aggregate gains to that actor but inflict relatively small
harms to any one consumer.346
342. For instance, local regulatory bodies, like the Better Business Bureau, assist
consumers and businesses in specific localized regions. See THE BETTER BUSINESS BUREAU,
http://www.bbb.org (last visited Feb. 17, 2012).
343. See Issacharoff, supra note 60, at 138. 
344. See id. at 137. 
345. Id. at 138-39.
346. Issacharoff & Samuel, supra note 12, at 58 & n.26.
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One promising mechanism of regulation—particularly given that
individual consumers frequently lack the access to or ability to
comprehend information about relevant wrongdoing347—is one that
is not generally associated with litigation. Rather, it is the provision
of new—or capitalization of existing—private market agents, who
could more systematically impose pressures on sellers to refrain
from engaging in wrongdoing.348 The Internet’s broad reach could
help such agents—like Consumer Reports, which tests and reports
on product safety and effectiveness, and Progressive Auto Insur-
ance, which provides on-the-spot insurance rate comparisons based
on driving history—impose constraints even on nationalized or
globalized product markets.349 The ability of these agents to impose
reputational and other market pressures, however, depends on the
availability and accessibility of reliable and relevant information:
whereas auto insurance rates are relatively easy to calculate given
the public availability of driving records and accident reports,
account information for, say, cell phone or credit card usage, is
generally not accessible en masse for sound privacy reasons.350 The
relevant sellers—cell phone companies, airlines, computer mer-
chants, just to name a few—have this information on hand and
naturally guard it closely.351 To the extent tolerable, then, given
concerns for consumer confidentiality, instead of enacting more laws
that require disclosures to consumers—laws rarely read, more
rarely understood, and almost never acted upon352—Congress could,
as one scholar has suggested, pass laws requiring disclosure of
information to consumer market agents in a usable form and on an
aggregate scale, sanitized of individual identifiers.353
347. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
348. See Issacharoff, supra note 210, at 8-11. Consumers are frequently ineffective agents
on their own behalf. They rarely read, understand, or incorporate disclosures. Even if they
had time to read through the disclosures, they have no access to the aggregate information
to which the seller is privy and which is necessary to ferret out wrongdoing. See Issacharoff,
supra note 210, at 7-8.
349. See Issacharoff, supra note 210, at 4, 10.
350. See id. at 10.
351. See id.
352. In one revealing experiment, a computer software maker put an offer of one thousand
dollars at the end of its mandated disclosure. All consumers had to do to claim the money was
to call and ask. After four months, a single individual called, strongly suggesting that no other
customer had even read the disclosure. Id. at 6-7.
353. See id. at 11.
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Nonetheless, although private market agents are a promising
source of regulation in the area of consumer welfare, the current
consumer landscape reveals that private, ex post litigation through
state-law claims is critical to the regulation of wrongdoing. And
given that such wrongdoing increasingly occurs on a nationalized
or even globalized scale, effective consumer protection requires
mechanisms that address both the negative value of any individual’s
potential claim and the difficulty of detecting wrongdoing in the first
place. Regarding the former, the class action mechanism, of course,
exists in part to overcome the problem of negative-value claims.354
Yet it is precisely in the context of consumer transactions—and
largely in the context of transactions for goods provided to individu-
als on a national or global scale—that the class action device is
being banned via private ordering.355 As discussed above, such bans
have recently found favor with the Court.356 
In an attempt to preserve the viability of class action waivers,
some companies have inserted arbitration clauses providing that the
drafting party will pay any relevant arbitration fees in order to
make individual arbitration economically viable.357 Perhaps in other
areas of the law, where victims of harm are more likely capable of
recognizing wrongdoing, arbitration pursuant to such clauses could
serve as a viable enforcement mechanism, and potentially even as
a substitute for the class action device, for cases involving low-value
claims.358
354. See Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997).
355. See supra notes 136-41 and accompanying text.
356. See supra text accompanying note 135. In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.
Ct. 1740 (2011), plaintiff consumers brought a class action against AT&T claiming that its
offer of a “free” phone was fraudulent because AT&T charged consumers sales tax based on
the retail value of each phone. Id. at 1740. Although each individual claim was small, AT&T’s
overall gain was quite substantial, given its large customer base. The relevant contracts
between consumers and AT&T contained an arbitration clause with a class action waiver. Id.
at 1742. AT&T argued—and the Supreme Court in a divided opinion agreed—that the FAA
implicitly preempted California state law banning the use of such waivers. Id. at 1753. AT&T
also contended that, because its contract provided that it would, among other things, cover
consumers’ arbitration fees, the class action was not needed for the vindication of claims. Brief
for Petioner at 1, Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (No. 09-893).
357. See Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, Arbitration’s Summer
Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer
Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 893-94 (2008).
358. That said, the wholesale elimination of the class action from the regulatory landscape
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However, within the area of consumer welfare, where harm is
frequently hidden and widely dispersed, the availability of arbitra-
tion pursuant to such fee-shifting clauses is insufficient to bring
about private enforcement of wrongdoing. Rather, the ferreting out
of misconduct like consumer fraud requires expertise frequently not
in the hands of consumers.359 They are thus unlikely, on their own,
to possess or process relevant information in such a way that will
motivate them to arbitrate. Moreover, it is inconceivable that a
private attorney, who might have sufficient expertise in consumer
fraud, will have the economic incentive to root out consumer fraud
if the only economic gain to be had is through individual arbitra-
tions. The significant investment of resources required to identify
wronged individuals and to pursue their small claims on an indi-
vidualized basis likely will not justify any eventual gains.360 As a
result, very little private enforcement is likely to occur—much less
enforcement that would come close to bringing about recovery for
the aggregate loss sustained by numerous customers—absent en-
forcement mechanisms, such as the class action, that would moti-
vate those with expertise to investigate and pursue meritorious
claims.361 Again, however, courts and scholars have approached
class action waivers in the consumer context abstractly, applying a
would remove the very pressure valve that forced companies like AT&T to include fee-shifting
provisions in their contracts in the first place. The fact that the class action imposed such
pressure on AT&T is plainly evident from its contracts with consumers, which contain a
severability clause whereby the invalidation of its class waiver by any court triggers the
severance of the arbitration clause altogether. See Wireless Customer Agreement § 9.2, AT&T,
http://www.wireless.att.com/learn/articles-resources/wireless-terms.jsp (last visited Feb. 17,
2012).
359. See supra notes 215-18 and accompanying text.
360. In theory, firms devoted to the investigation of widespread consumer harm and the
processing of individual claims through arbitration might well arise, though such entities
have yet to spring into being. See generally Nora Freeman Engstrom, Sunlight and Settlement
Mills, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 805 (2011) (discussing firms devoted to processing low-value tort
claims). 
361. Of course, this is one of the most controversial aspects of the class action device:
namely, that it works precisely because it motivates self-interested third parties to investigate
and pursue claims on an aggregate basis in hopes of recovering a substantial “bounty” for
their efforts. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Nathan D. Larson, Class Actions, Litigation
Autonomy, and the Foundations of Procedural Due Process, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1573, 1601-02
(2007) (characterizing class action attorneys as “bounty hunters”). Absent other mechanisms
of enforcement, however, this may be a necessary cost—and all regulatory regimes have
costs—of ensuring some modicum of regulation of consumer harm.
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single metric of analysis.362 Instead, courts and scholars alike must
be attentive to the regulatory framework at issue in evaluating
these prohibitions. More specifically, in the area of consumer claims,
courts should err on the side of striking down such waivers. 
But refining enforcement mechanism in light of particular
regulatory exigencies should not stop there. For instance, existing
mechanisms of private enforcement, and particularly class actions,
are often insufficient to regulate widespread wrongdoing.363 At the
same time, many of these same enforcement mechanisms—in par-
ticular the class action mechanism—may go too far: in regulating
widespread harm, such mechanisms may export aberrant regulation
onto nationwide or globalized disputes involving noncitizens.364
Addressing these regulatory mismatches thus requires the creation
of new mechanisms, or the modification of existing mechanisms,
that will sufficiently regulate widespread harm, while also con-
straining the reach of such mechanisms so as to prevent the expor-
tation of aberrant law. 
At the national level, existing enforcement mechanisms designed
to address widespread harm are in many instances inadequate to
align the remediation of wrongdoing with its scope. In particular,
neither the class action mechanism nor the consolidation of cases in
MDL courts—which exist partly to bring into alignment the
regulation of harms with their widespread scope365—are perfectly
situated to address these regulatory mismatches. To begin, variance
among state laws governing class procedures and among state
substantive laws often prevents class certification, and thus renders
the class device unable to effectuate private regulation of wide-
spread wrongdoing on a nationalized level. Such variance exists
not only in the form of differing state court interpretations of
state analogues of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23366 but also in
362. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
363. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1355-56 (1995).
364. See Jesse T. Smallwood, Note, Nationwide, State Law Class Actions and the Beauty
of Federalism, 53 DUKE L.J. 1137, 1149-50 (2003) (describing the Seventh Circuit’s concerns
over the sweeping effect of class action decisions).
365. See, e.g., Yvette Ostelaza & Michelle Hartmann, Overview of Multidistrict Litigation
Rules at the State and Federal Level, 26 REV. LITIG. 47, 48-50 (2007).
366. See, e.g., Allan Erbsen, From “Predominance” to “Resolvability”: A New Approach to
Regulating Class Actions, 58 VAND. L. REV. 995, 1005-06 (2005) (describing the predominance
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the form of variance among different state laws governing, for
example, tort liability.367 In a few instances, judges have attempted
to overcome such certification problems through creative interpre-
tation of choice-of-law rules,368 but such efforts are both ad hoc and
controversial under existing conflicts of law principles.369 For class
actions to resolve widespread harm on a national scale, additional
mechanisms may be needed, including perhaps substantive federal
law governing consumer harm or uniform choice of law rules that
make it easier to aggregate claims under Rule 23. 
At the same time, the use of the class action device to address
widespread harm can also generate a separate sort of regulatory
mismatch whereby an aberrant court exports its idiosyncratic
regulatory views on the entire nation. Because the denial of class
certification generally does not carry preclusive effect,370 plaintiffs
may be able to obtain certification of a nationwide class by an
aberrant state or federal court,371 which along with a state’s law,
will effectively regulate a particular area of law nationwide.372
Defendants may also engage in aberrant court shopping of their
own, looking for a court to sanction a deal that is desirable from
their perspective, but that may be a product of collusion between
test as “rel[ying] on a subjective comparison of inherently incomparable factors”).
367. For instance, variance among state laws governing tort liability has in large part
prevented the nationwide resolution of claims against Phillip Morris Tobacco Company for
widespread harm arising from the same alleged conduct by Phillip Morris. See, e.g., Grill v.
Phillip Morris USA, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 2d 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); City of St. Louis v. Am. Tobacco
Co., No. 982-09652, 2003 WL 23277277 (Cir. Ct. Mo. Dec. 16, 2003); In re Tobacco Litig., No.
00-C-5000, 2000 WL 34016275 (Cir. Ct. W. Va. Jan. 11, 2000).
368. See, e.g., In re “Agent Orange” Prods. Liab. Litig., 560 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1353-54
(J.P.M.L. 2008). 
369. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547,
561-63 (1996).
370. See Rhonda Wasserman, Tolling: The American Pipe Tolling Rule and Successive
Class Actions, 58 FLA. L. REV. 803, 841 (2006).
371. A practical effect of CAFA has been that plaintiffs simply attempt to file class action
suits, in the first instance, in federal courts thought to be friendly to plaintiffs or class actions.
See Nicole Ochi, Are Consumer Class and Mass Actions Dead? Complex Litigation Strategies
After CAFA & MMTJA, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 965, 1031 (2008) (noting that CAFA has
eliminated vertical, but not horizontal, forum shopping).
372. Judge Easterbrook put the problem thus: “A single positive trumps all the negatives.
Even if just one judge in ten believes that a nationwide class is lawful, then if the plaintiffs
file in ten different states the probability that at least one will certify a nationwide class is
65%.” In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763, 766-67 (7th Cir.
2003).
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defense and plaintiffs’ counsel, and that may unfairly distinguish
among class members.373 This aberrant court shopping works not
only to enable deals that might not have otherwise occurred but also
to break up deals that would, under most courts’ analysis, be
preserved.374 Accordingly, more sophisticated doctrines of preclusion
or, at the very least, doctrines requiring courts to review the denial
of class certification by a sister court under a deferential standard,
may be needed to address these mismatches. 
Given the class action’s many shortcomings as a mechanism for
regulating nationalized harm, parties have increasingly turned to
MDL proceedings, which consolidate for pretrial purposes cases
alleging similar wrongdoing in order to achieve claim resolution on
a larger scale.375 In particular, MDL judges increasingly conduct
bellwether trials to enable the settlement of claims for widespread
harm on a scale more commensurate to the scope of the harm and,
from defendants’ perspective, to enable the achievement of global
peace.376 Scholars have only just begun to explore the benefits of the
bellwether mechanism for clarifying issues, assembling “pre-trial
packages” of information relevant to many plaintiffs, and giving
parties a window into the likelihood of success on the merits of cases
of widespread harm.377 
However, in addition to being disproportionately costly—given the
tendency to invest large amounts of resources in a bellwether trial
373. See Coffee, supra note 363, at 1378-82. 
374. This is the problem engendered by the combination of collateral attacks on a class
settlement with conceptual confusion among courts regarding the functioning of the “adequate
representation” requirement under Rule 23. See Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregate Litigation
Across the Atlantic and the Future of American Exceptionalism, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1, 18, 76-77
(2009). Although the Anti-Injunction Act somewhat mitigates this problem at the federal
level, state courts have little authority to enjoin collateral attacks on their judgments in other
judicial systems. The preclusive effect of a state court judgment is instead determined by
other courts employing “Full Faith and Credit” principles. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738 (2006). The Court recently faced an iteration of this issue: it decided that a federal
court that denied class certification could not prevent unnamed class members from seeking
class certification in state, instead of federal, court. Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368,
2382 (2011). 
375. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (governing multi-district litigation).
376. Eldon E. Fallon et al., Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REV.
2323 (2008). 
377. For a thorough introduction to bellwether trials, see generally id.                               
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that involves few claimants but will influence thousands more—
bellwether trials can, like the class action, lead to the export of an
aberrant MDL judge’s idiosyncratic regulatory views to the entire
nation.378 The phenomenon of bellwether trials is in its infancy; it is
sufficient here to note that, as such procedures develop, carefully
designed mechanisms regarding trial selection and adjudication
ought to be implemented. Perhaps, for instance, rules  currently not
in place—or even suggested in any meaningful way in the Manual
for Complex Litigation379—requiring a certain number of bellwether
trials by a variety of MDL judges could be enacted to avoid these
regulatory mismatches. Alternatively, or in addition, perhaps a
group of independent adjudicators, whose only responsibility would
be to impartially select the test cases for bellwether adjudication,
could be empanelled. 
When harm occurs on a global scale, many of the regulatory
mismatches discussed above are more pronounced, given the inade-
quacy of existing mechanisms to resolve disputes on a global level.
To begin, for example, a great deal of variance exists among pro-
cedural rules regarding aggregate litigation among European na-
tions and between Europe and the United States; consequently,
bringing into an aggregate unit numerous individuals harmed by
transnational wrongdoing is difficult, and often impossible.380
Combined with European nations’ general reluctance to “enable”
litigation,381 in part because of Europe’s heavier reliance on cen-
tralized, ex ante mechanisms of regulation, such disparities often
prevent regulation in any way commensurate with the scope of
alleged harm.382 Although Europe has begun to put in place devices
for aggregate litigation,383 such devices are not yet supported by the
additional mechanisms necessary for their proper functioning. 
378. Cf. supra notes 370-73 and accompanying text.
379. See generally MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) (2004).
380. See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, The Globalization of Class Actions: An Overview, 622
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 7, 13-17 (2009).
381. See, e.g., Julia Werdigier, Survey Sees More U.S.-Style Class-Action Lawsuits in
Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2007, http://nytimes.com/2007/10/30/business/worldbusiness/
30iht-class.4.8118070.htm.
382. See generally Filippo Valguarnesa, Legal Tradition as an Obstacle: Europe’s Difficult
Journey to Class Action, 10 GLOBAL JURIST, no. 2, 2010.
383. See id. at 1.
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Specifically, aggregate litigation mechanisms are not self-
starting; they require both competent private attorneys with ex-
pertise in particular areas that enables them to discover certain
types of harm and sophisticated experts who can sort through
the complexities underlying alleged widespread wrongdoing.384
Moreover, aggregate devices rely in part upon well-capitalized and
motivated plaintiffs’ attorneys. In the United States, the contingent
fee has served as a mechanism for motivating plaintiffs’ attorneys;
most European nations forbid such arrangements.385 Although
Europe need not necessarily adopt contingent fee arrangements, it
should adopt mechanisms that enable both plaintiffs and firms to
finance and assume the risk of aggregate litigation. Such mecha-
nisms may be emerging: third-party financing of litigation has
taken hold in Australia, and such arrangements have started to
make their way to the United Kingdom and the United States.386
Such financing arrangements raise a host of ethical and managerial
questions that are beyond the scope of this Article, but it is suffi-
cient to note that such mechanisms are coming into existence, and
in many ways, need to exist, if ex post regulation of globalized harm
is to occur. 
Even in the absence of aggregation devices, as Richard Nagareda
has recognized, more sophisticated preclusion and judgment rec-
ognition mechanisms may address some of these globalized regu-
latory mismatches, as such mechanisms could enable systems with
aggregate devices in place, like the United States, to resolve inter-
384. See Issacharoff & Samuel, supra note 12, at 60-61.
385. Generally, European nations require class members to pay fees up front. See Hensler,
supra note 380, at 22. This naturally discourages participation. For instance, in the largest
European consumer protection class action in 2003, 6000 of 55,000 members dropped out
because of the up-front costs required before trial could begin. See Weir v. State, [2005]
EWHC (Ch) 2192, [1] (Eng.). The class members were also responsible for paying the
government’s costs once the court found for the government. Mark Milner, Railtrack
Shareholders Lose Court Battle for Compensation, GUARDIAN, Oct. 15, 2005, http://www.
guardian.co.uk/business/2005/oct/15/transportintheuk.politics.
386. See, e.g., Daniel Fisher, Litigation-Finance Contract Reveals How Investors Back
Lawsuits, FORBES, June 6, 2011, http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2011/06/07/
litigation-finance-contract-reveals-how-investors-back-lawsuits/  (discussing the Burford
Group, which has funded litigation in the United Kingdom and the United States); Litigation
Funding (Third Party Funding), ARGENT LAW, http://www.argentlaw.co.uk/site/business_
services/litigation_funding/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2012); see also supra note 174.
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national claims.387 A few such mechanisms, though highly imperfect,
are beginning to take shape. For instance, the European Union’s
2000 Regulation on Jurisdiction and the Recognition of Judgments
(EU Regulations) provides in Article 34 that judgments shall be
recognized among member states unless “such recognition is
manifestly contrary to public policy in the Member State in which
recognition is sought.”388 In the United States, the American Law
Institute’s (ALI) proposal for the recognition of foreign judgments in
U.S. courts is modeled on Article 34.389 For preclusion to apply,
judgments thus “need only meet an ‘international standard’ of fair-
ness.”390 Although such mechanisms are a good start, future work
must continue to explore both enforcement mechanisms that can
regulate harm that occurs on a national or global scale and mecha-
nisms that limit the ways courts or adjudicators can export aberrant
law. 
As the foregoing discussion suggests, exploring both the role of
private ex post mechanisms of enforcement and the appropriate
design of those mechanisms in light of the exigencies of overall
regulatory schemes has broader implications. It allows us to con-
sider, in a more unified analysis, relationships among issues of
informational advantage, issues of statutory interpretation, pro-
cedural mechanisms such as those providing for aggregate litiga-
tion, and problems associated with the integration of regulatory
objectives between potential regulators and across nationalized and
even globalized forms of harm. Consideration of these topics inde-
pendently misses the interlocking dimensions that this Article’s
conceptual framework reveals and thus will often fail to guide the
design of enforcement mechanisms in a way that achieves compre-
hensive regulation and addresses potential regulatory pathologies.
387. See Nagareda, supra note 374, at 9.
388. Council Regulation 44/2001, On Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, art. 34.1, 2000 O.J. (L 12) 1 (EC).
389. See AM. LAW INST., RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS:
ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE § 5(a)(vi) (2006).
390. Id. reporters’ notes at 77. 
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 CONCLUSION
This Article has focused on the important yet often under-
appreciated structural role that private enforcement mechanisms
play in our diffuse, decentralized regulatory system. Indeed, there
is a decidedly public dimension, both structural and functional, to
private regulation of wrongdoing. This Article has argued that the
ability of private parties to take on this role within our regulatory
state depends critically on the existence of various enforcement
mechanisms appropriately calibrated to the functional exigencies of
a given substantive scheme. 
A clear framework carefully tailored to the structural role
mechanisms of private enforcement through litigation within our
public regulatory system is much needed in a world of increasingly
complex and globalized harms. The framework presented here is
preferable to one-size-fits-all, abstract approaches that are fre-
quently ill-suited to effectuating regulatory goals with more
nuanced approaches aimed at aligning private regulation with the
needs of various regulatory schemes. Judges and legislatures should
use this framework as a guide for designing mechanisms that
enable private regulation to serve well its structural role in the
American regulatory state.
